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WE THREE KINGS: DISINTERMEDIATING VOTING AT THE 
INDEX FUND GIANTS 
CALEB N. GRIFFIN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 The meteoric rise of passive investing has placed three large in-
dex funds—Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street—in a new and 
pivotal role as the arbiters of corporate law controversies and the 
framers of market-wide governance standards.  This Article will 
propose reshaping the approach to investment stewardship at the 
Big Three index funds to empower individual index fund investors 
and to enable their involvement in the decision-making process.  
The involvement of individual investors could take one of three 
forms.  First, an “indirect democracy” approach would allow in-
dividual investors to elect to have the votes corresponding to their 
indirect share ownership cast according to the recommendations 
of a particular agent.  Second, a policy of “informed discretion” 
would entail solicitation by index fund providers of more infor-
mation about the characteristics and values of their investors, 
which they would use to better inform their voting decisions.  
Third, “pass-through voting instructions” would give individual 
investors the opportunity to participate in shareholder voting by 
completing a general, issue-based survey about how they desire to 
vote on a number of key issues.  The uniting feature of all three 
approaches is that they would involve individual investors in the 
voting process to a greater degree, thereby diminishing the power 
of index fund agents, mitigating concerns about the concentrated 
power of index funds, and reducing agency costs. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is a fairy tale that goes something like this: Once upon a time, in 
the faraway land of Sharetopia, there lived three powerful kings.  They acted 
as stewards of their citizens’ money (for a small fee of course), and their 
control over this money gave them influence over large swaths of the land’s 
productive activities.  As the power of these kings grew until it dominated the 
whole of Sharetopia, the citizens began to wonder whether the kings were 
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ever tempted to use their power in their own self-interest rather than in the 
interests of their citizens.  When the citizens presented these concerns at an 
audience with the kings, the kings declared that it would take far too many 
resources to figure out the actual interests of their citizens, even in very gen-
eral terms.  Instead, the three kings promised that they would use their power 
in the citizens’ “best interests,” although they reserved the right to define 
exactly what that might mean.  When the citizens asked whether they might 
provide some thoughts about what their own “best interests” were, the kings 
politely declined.  In any event, the kings noted, the very high barriers to 
entry for the position of king meant that, now and for the foreseeable future, 
the citizens had few realistic alternatives.  The citizens went home pleased to 
have such a well-functioning democracy. 
As it currently stands, the index fund voting landscape—dominated by 
three massive index funds—shares some striking similarities with the satiri-
cal Sharetopia.  Index fund investors entrust their savings to index fund pro-
viders, who retain the power to vote the fund’s proxies.  In lieu of a true 
democracy where index fund investors would be involved in voting deci-
sions, index fund agents can vote shares representing their investors’ eco-
nomic stake in a given firm with only very limited constraints: First, index 
funds must disclose certain information about their voting policies and the 
votes they cast.1  Second, index funds are required to vote “in a manner con-
sistent with the best interests” of index fund investors.2 
There are some important problems with the “best interests” standard.  
The first question begging to be answered is, whose best interests?  One hun-
dred percent of investors?  Fifty-one percent?  Should values and preferences 
held by only a minority of investors be accorded any importance at all?  A 
key problem is that fund investors are human beings, and, as human beings, 
they have diverse preferences and values.  Currently, funds ignore the diver-
sity of their investors while voting their shares, preferring to identically vote 
virtually all the shares they own.3  Second, even if funds were clear on exactly 
whose interests the fund should be representing, and whether such represen-
tation should be winner-take-all or proportional, how do index funds discover 
                                                          
 1.  See generally Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Regis-
tered Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release 
No. 47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Jan. 31, 2003) (sum-
marizing the rule and form amendments adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission).  
 2.  Id. (“An investment adviser voting proxies on behalf of a fund . . . must do so in a manner 
consistent with the best interests of the fund and its shareholders.”). 
 3.  See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concen-
tration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 316–17 (2017).  But 
see VANGUARD, VANGUARD FUNDS PLAN TO GRANT PROXY VOTING RESPONSIBILITIES TO 
EXTERNAL MANAGERS (2019), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-
and-commentary/proxy_ext_mgrs.pdf (indicating that Vanguard will outsource some proxy voting 
to external managers). 
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or discern those interests?  Currently, they make no serious effort to do so.  
Interestingly, this obviates the need for index fund managers to answer the 
first question—simply ignoring that diverse preferences exist makes short 
work of addressing those preferences.  Third, the vagueness of the “best in-
terests” standard, and the lack of any mandate to discover any actual interests 
of their shareholders, makes it difficult to hold fund management accountable 
for violating the standard, potentially increasing agency costs.4  Beyond a 
clear conflict of interest, it seems likely that the “best interests” standard 
would be satisfied by virtually any colorable claim to that effect.  This means 
that, where a plausible argument can be made for supporting either side, fund 
managers have near total discretion in their voting decisions, regardless of 
whether substantial amounts of their investors disagree and without even at-
tempting to discern whether they disagree.  Thus, while the “best interests” 
standard is likely to prevent the most serious conflicts of interest, it is little 
more than a fiduciary fig leaf when it comes to promoting accountability and 
cabining the voting discretion of fund management. 
This Article will analyze the implications of index funds’ rise to power 
and their increasing dominance over corporate decisionmaking.  Part II will 
begin with a brief description of the index fund’s rise to power, moving in 
Part III to an analysis of their current capacity to influence corporate govern-
ance.  Part IV will contain a detailed analysis of how index funds’ shares are 
currently voted.  Part V will examine the changes wrought by index funds’ 
growing influence and discuss a number of key concerns engendered by their 
current scale and voting practices.  In Part VI, this Article will analyze the 
strengths and weaknesses of several proposed solutions and the reasons why 
they fall short.  Part VII will propose an alternate approach, which disinter-
mediates index fund voting by involving individual index fund investors in 
the process of setting voting priorities.  Ultimately, this Article will argue that 
this approach could re-democratize shareholder democracy and effectively 
reduce the power of the Big Three while obviating the need for more drastic 
solutions. 
II.  THE RISE OF THE INDEX FUND 
A.  Theoretical Origins of the Index Fund 
A group of influential economists laid the foundation for the creation of 
the first index fund in a series of academic papers.  In 1965, Professor Paul 
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Samuelson published a seminal article in which he demonstrated mathemat-
ically that future stock prices fluctuate unpredictably.5  That same year, Pro-
fessor Eugene Fama coined his Efficient Market Hypothesis, which holds 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to outperform the stock market given that 
market prices incorporate information quickly and efficiently.6  In 1967, Pro-
fessor Michael Jensen provided empirical proof to support Fama’s theory, 
showing that, from 1945 to 1964, market indexes outperformed actively man-
aged funds.7  In 1973, Professor Burton G. Malkiel explicitly called for the 
creation of the index fund: “[F]und spokesmen are quick to point out, ‘You 
can’t buy the averages.’  It’s time the public could.”8  Specifically, he called 
for “a no-load, minimum-management-fee mutual fund that simply buys the 
hundreds of stocks making up the broad stock-market averages and does no 
trading [of securities].”9  In other words, he called for an index fund. 
B.  Emergence of the Index Fund 
Eventually, the call of these economists came to fruition: A man named 
John Bogle filed the Declaration of Trust for the first index fund, First Index 
Investment Trust, on December 31, 1975.10  Bogle, founder of the Vanguard 
Group, had successfully convinced his board to launch a fund that would at-
tempt to simply mirror the performance of the S&P 500 rather than attempt-
ing to outperform the market by picking individual stocks.11  The emergence 
of this fund was met with great enthusiasm by Professor Paul Samuelson and 
other economists, who lauded the fund for attempting to match a broad-based 
index of the overall market, charging very low fees, having low portfolio 
turnover, offering high levels of diversification, and being available to inves-
tors of modest means—features that would serve as hallmarks of index funds 
going forward.12 
Despite the support of such economists, the initial performance of the 
fund was characterized by Bogle himself as “a complete flop.”13  The fund 
                                                          
 5.  Paul A. Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. 
MGMT. REV. 41 (1965). 
 6.  Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 55, 59 
(1965). 
 7.  Michael C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945–1964, 23 J. FIN. 
389 (1967). 
 8.  BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 226 (1973). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  John C. Bogle, The First Index Mutual Fund: A History of Vanguard Index Trust and the 
Vanguard Index Strategy, VANGUARD (1997), https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20130507033534/http://www.vanguard.com/bogle_site/lib/sp19970401.html.  
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  The Index Fund Turns 40—And Gets Its Revenge, NASDAQ (Sept. 1, 2016), 
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/index-fund-turns-40-and-gets-its-revenge-2016-09-01. 
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fell a whopping 95% short of its original goal for its initial public offering, 
achieving a paltry $11.4 million in assets rather than the $150 million initially 
envisioned.14  Given its limited size, the fund was not even able to own all of 
the stocks in the S&P 500 index, and it instead invested in only 280 stocks.15 
For its part, Wall Street as a whole seemed to reject the strategy of in-
dexed investment.16  Edward C. Johnson, III, Fidelity’s chairman at the time, 
put it this way: “I can’t believe . . . that the great mass of investors are [sic] 
going to be satisfied with just receiving average returns.  The name of the 
game is to be the best.”17  Such a statement, however, ignored emerging data 
on the general superiority of returns from index investing.18  Due to a com-
bination of hubris and self-interest, the major players in the industry were 
loath to believe that funds that passively mirrored the market could be supe-
rior to funds that were directed and managed by some of America’s brightest 
minds. 
C.  The Growth of Index Funds 
As its poor initial reception foretold, the index fund remained relatively 
obscure well into the 1980s.19  The First Index Investment Trust attracted an 
average of only $16 million per year in cash flow in its first decade,20 and it 
remained the sole index fund until 1984, when Wells Fargo opened a fund 
that was also designed to match the performance of the S&P 500.21 
However, as time wore on, the index fund began to demonstrate the fi-
nancial benefits of passive investing.  From the period 1981 to 1986, Van-
guard’s First Index Investment Trust outperformed actively managed funds 
by 3.0 percentage points.22  It again outperformed other funds by 2.1 percent-
age points from 1987 to 1992 and again by 2.6 percentage points from 1992 
to 1997.23 
This success was noticed in the marketplace, and more and more com-
petitor index funds emerged.24  Even Fidelity came around, finally offering 
its own index fund in 1990.25  By 2000, index funds, and their cousin the 
                                                          
 14.  Bogle, supra note 10. 
 15.  The Index Fund Turns 40—And Gets Its Revenge, supra note 13. 
 16.  Bogle, supra note 10. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Jensen, supra note 7. 
 19.  Bogle, supra note 10. 
 20.  John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds, WALL ST. J.  (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-on-index-funds-1543504551. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Bogle, supra note 10. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
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index-based exchange-traded fund (“ETF”),26 had acquired 2% of the overall 
equity market in the United States.27 
That figure, however, was only the beginning of index funds’ explosive 
growth.  By 2002, index funds had more than doubled their holdings to reach 
4.5% of the entire U.S. stock market.28  By 2009, the funds had doubled again 
to 9%.29  By 2018, the funds had nearly doubled yet again, reaching 17%.30 
Even 17% likely understates the scale of index fund ownership, as it 
excludes index fund assets held by pension funds, insurance companies, non-
profits and foreign funds, as well as assets invested in “closet index funds” 
(funds that totally or nearly track an index while claiming to be actively man-
aged).31  Altogether, index funds likely control greater than 20%, and poten-
tially 30% or more, of nearly all publicly-traded companies in the United 
States.32  This figure is expected to grow further, with some predicting that 
index funds will control the majority of shares at most American corporations 
in the near future.33 
III.  INDEX FUNDS’ INCREASING INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
As the index fund has grown, so too has the power of index funds to 
influence corporate governance.  This Part explores index funds’ increasing 
influence on corporate governance.  Section III.A examines index funds’ 
transition from relative inconsequence to a position of considerable influence 
over corporate governance.  Section III.B explores the key mechanisms by 
which index funds exert that influence: (1) standard setting, (2) engagements, 
                                                          
 26.  ETFs are typically funds that issue shares in large blocks, creation units, to their partici-
pants.  These units are then traded as shares on an exchange.  Because these funds are often linked 
to an index fund, they have much in common with index funds themselves.  For most corporate 
governance purposes and this paper as a whole, index funds and ETFs will be considered function-
ally equivalent and will be referred to generally as index funds.  See John C. Coates IV, Reforming 
the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 1 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 591, 682 (2009) (explaining the basic characteristics of ETFs); John C. Coates, 
The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve, 1, 10 (Harv. Pub. L. Working 
Paper No. 19-07, 2018) [hereinafter Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I] (explain-
ing the functional similarity between ETFs and index funds). 
 27.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 10. 
 28.  Bogle, supra note 20. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 10. 
 32.  Id. at 13. 
 33.  See Trevor Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by 2024: 
Moody’s, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2017, 9:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-passive/in-
dex-funds-to-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by2024-moodys-idUSKBN15H1PN (predicting 
that index funds will hold over half of the market by 2024); Coates, The Future of Corporate Gov-
ernance Part I, supra note 26, at 13 (“[E]ven if the trend flattens, the majority of most companies 
will soon be owned by indexed funds.”). 
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and (3) proxy voting.  Throughout, it emphasizes the significant increase in 
index funds’ influence in recent decades and how that influence stems pri-
marily from index funds’ right to vote proxies for their voluminous holdings. 
A.  From Rational Apathy to Significant Influence 
In the early days of the index fund, these vehicles owned such a small 
share of the overall market that their ability to influence corporate behavior 
was virtually non-existent.34  Accordingly, it made sense for managers of in-
dex funds to be rationally apathetic to the management of portfolio compa-
nies and to defer to other market actors on corporate governance decisions.35  
For their first few decades, index funds had no material impact on overall 
corporate governance or on the behavior of individual firms. 
The situation has changed enormously in recent decades: these funds 
have gone from controlling virtually 0% of shares to controlling 20-30% of 
shares at nearly all publicly traded companies in the United States.36  Even 
the sheer size of the holdings controlled by index funds understates their 
power, as control of the index funds themselves is highly concentrated.  Just 
three index fund providers control the bulk of index fund assets.37  Known 
together as the “Big Three,” Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street collec-
tively own 81% of index funds assets.38  Vanguard itself owns 51%, while 
BlackRock owns 21%, and State Street owns 9%.39  In 2017, these three play-
ers controlled roughly 15% of the S&P 500, representing a radical departure 
from the traditional dispersed ownership of the stock market.40  Taken to-
gether, the Big Three constitute the largest investor in 88% of the S&P 500, 
giving the trio an unprecedented hold on corporate America.41 
The nature of the index fund industry suggests that no competitors will 
successfully wrest that control away from the Big Three.  Low fees are a 
cornerstone of the index fund business model, and it would be extraordinarily 
difficult for a new competitor to outperform on fees given the massive econ-
omies of scale enjoyed by the Big Three.42  Indeed, with some index funds 
now charging no fees at all,43 new funds likely have little financial incentive 
                                                          
 34.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 10. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Bogle, supra note 20. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 10. 
 41.  Eric A. Posner et al., A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Inves-
tors, 81 ANTITRUST L. J. 669, 676 (2017).  
 42.  Bogle, supra note 20. 
 43.  Fidelity offers Fidelity ZERO Large Cap Index Fund (“FNILX”), Fidelity ZERO Extended 
Market Index Fund (“FZIPX”), Fidelity ZERO Total Market Index Fund (“FZROX”), and Fidelity 
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to enter the market and little to gain if they do, further decreasing the likeli-
hood of a new competitor emerging.44  Thus, it appears that the concentrated 
power of the Big Three is likely to endure. 
The power of the Big Three is even greater than their substantial share 
ownership suggests, due to the fact that a significant fraction of shareholders 
do not vote their shares.45  For example, only 28% of shares held by individ-
ual investors were voted at annual meetings in 2019.46 Because of this absen-
teeism, index funds control a greater percentage of voted shares than they do 
shares as a whole.47  This amplifies their power over voting decisions.  In 
even reasonably close contests, such power has the potential to determine the 
overall outcome.48  Additionally, certain regulatory developments that have 
decreased the number of votes cast, such as the elimination of discretionary 
broker voting in uncontested director elections49 and the implementation of 
the e-proxy “notice and access” system,50 have had the (likely unintended) 
consequence of shifting additional power to the Big Three. 
Overall, index funds have gone from having virtually no ability to influ-
ence corporate decisionmaking to having substantial influence in a remarka-
bly short amount of time.  As a result, the situation has transformed from one 
                                                          
ZERO International Index Fund (“FZILX”), which all feature a 0% expense ratio and no minimums 
to invest.  Mutual Fund Investing Ideas, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/invest-
ing-ideas/index-funds (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
 44.  Bogle, supra note 20. 
 45.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 13–14. 
 46.  PROXYPULSE, 2019 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 5 (2019), https://www.broadridge.com/_as-
sets/pdf/broadridge-proxypulse-2019-review.pdf. 
 47.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 13. 
 48.  Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani, & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: 
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors 18 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working 
Paper No. 414, 2018) (March 2019) (referring to passive investors’ power to determine the outcome 
in many shareholder votes). 
 49.  Prior to 2009, brokers were able to vote the shares of beneficial owners that did not provide 
proxy voting instructions on matters that were considered “routine.”  These shares historically rep-
resented a meaningful voting bloc, amounting to roughly 19% of the shares voted at annual meet-
ings.  On July 1, 2009, the SEC approved an amendment to NYSE Rule 452 which classified director 
elections as “non-routine,” which effectively eliminated the ability of brokers to vote on candidates 
for the board.  Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or 
Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 873–74 (2010).  
 50.  Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Ensuring the Proxy Process Works for Shareholders, U.S. 
SEC & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/021915-
psclaa.html (“I noted in February 2009 that retail investor voting, already at low numbers, had plum-
meted at those companies using the notice and access model permitted by this rule.  Indeed, the 
reports that compiled statistics on the level of participation by investors before and after the notice 
and access model was put in place at their companies found decreases of over 30% for large inves-
tors, and over 60% for smaller investors.  Other reports find that retail response rates have declined 
each year since the introduction of the notice and access model, falling to less than a 13% response 
rate for the period from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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where it was rational for index funds to be apathetic about corporate deci-
sionmaking to one where they have their hands on the reigns of shareholder 
power. 
B.  How Index Funds Exert Their Influence 
Index funds exert their considerable influence in three primary channels: 
(1) standard setting, (2) engagements, and (3) voting their shares.51  Standard 
setting involves establishing general principles that encapsulate voting prior-
ities and beliefs about what constitutes good corporate governance.52  The 
index providers make these guidelines publicly available,53 an act which it-
self indirectly manifests the voting power of the index fund providers.54  In 
signaling how these funds will vote, index fund providers pressure companies 
toward certain ends even before a vote has been called.55  Additionally, by 
publishing principles of “good corporate governance,” the Big Three index 
providers (and other smaller players) have the opportunity to coordinate with-
out colluding, thereby further enhancing their potential power over corporate 
decisionmakers.56 
Second, index funds also participate in engagements.  Engagements in-
volve communication with management of a given company, whether in per-
son, by phone, by mail, or over e-mail.57  Through these communications, 
index fund providers are able to express their priorities, concerns, and desires 
directly to company management, thereby exerting influence over these de-
cisionmakers.58  These dialogues frequently result in portfolio companies al-
tering their practices or procedures voluntarily.59  Data suggest that these en-
gagements are occurring at a substantial number of companies.  In 2018, 
Vanguard conducted engagements with 721 different firms, representing 
47% of the firm’s total assets under management.60  In 2018, BlackRock was 
involved in 2049 company engagements with 1453 companies, representing 
                                                          
 51.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15–18. 
 52.  Id. at 15. 
 53.  See, e.g., VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL 
REPORT (2018), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commen-
tary/2018_investment_stewardship_annual_report.pdf; BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK INVESTMENT 
STEWARDSHIP: 2018 ANNUAL REPORT (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/litera-
ture/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-report-2018.pdf; STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, 
STEWARDSHIP 2017 (2017), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-gov-
ernance/2018/07/annual-stewardship-report-2017.pdf (last visited on Jan. 6, 2020). 
 54.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15–16. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Fisch et al., supra note 48, at 24–25. 
 58.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 16. 
 59.  Fisch et al., supra note 48, at 18–19. 
 60.  See VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53, at 9. 
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51.9% of BlackRock’s assets under management.61  In 2017, State Street par-
ticipated in a total of 2297 engagements, of which 676 involved direct com-
munication, either in-person or via telephone.62 
Third, index funds wield power by voting the shares controlled by their 
firm.63  In 2003, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is-
sued a rule that required index fund providers to disclose how they voted their 
shares in proxy vote contests.64  Though not explicitly required by the rule, 
index fund providers have since voted nearly all of their shares.65  Given their 
highly diversified holdings, the number of votes cast by these funds each year 
is enormous.  Vanguard voted on 168,786 proposals in 2018,66 while 
BlackRock voted on 158,942 proposals in 2018,67 and State Street voted on 
154,458 proposals in 2017.68  These shares are typically voted in accordance 
with the guidelines set out by the firms’ corporate governance teams and in 
accordance with the priorities expressed in engagements.69  In this way, each 
of these channels of influence can be used to support the other. 
IV.  HOW INDEX FUNDS’ SHARES ARE VOTED 
Given the power of index funds over corporate decisionmaking, a cru-
cial question emerges: How do index funds identify voting priorities and ul-
timately vote their shares?  This Part seeks to answer that question.  Section 
IV.A provides greater information on index funds’ approach to voting the 
proxies under their control.  It reveals that index funds’ votes are typically 
cast in unison for individual funds at a given fund family and in a similar 
manner for each of the Big Three index funds.  It further finds that decision-
making power is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, who gener-
ally make decisions in a generic rather than case-by-case fashion.  Section 
IV.B examines the deficiencies inherent in index funds’ approach to voting.  
                                                          
 61.  BLACKROCK, supra note 53, at 7. 
 62.  STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53, at 60. 
 63.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 17. 
 64.  Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6566 (Jan. 31, 2003) (“We believe, 
however, that the time has now arrived for the Commission to require mutual funds to disclose their 
proxy voting policies and procedures, and their actual voting records.  Investors in mutual funds 
have a fundamental right to know how the fund casts proxy votes on shareholders’ behalf.”).  
 65.  Fisch et al., supra note 48, at 21. 
 66.  VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53, at 34. 
 67.  BLACKROCK, supra note 53, at 20. 
 68.  STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53, at 4. 
 69.  See, e.g., VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53, at 3; BLACKROCK, supra note 
53, at 5–7; STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53, at 9–14. 
 
964 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:954 
It argues that funds’ voting practices inadequately incorporate the prefer-
ences of individual investors and leave such investors with no meaningful 
mechanism for proxy voting input. 
A.  Index Funds’ Approach to Voting 
Stewardship and voting decisions for the enormous number of shares 
controlled by the Big Three are typically made by a centralized investment 
stewardship team, which is responsible for creating voting guidelines and 
principles of good corporate governance, conducting engagements, and cast-
ing votes.70  Because these teams generally make voting decisions for all the 
shares controlled by the firm as a whole, the impact of the votes controlled 
by a given index fund provider is consolidated and the firm’s impact on cor-
porate decisionmaking is correspondingly amplified.71  Data on the matter 
reveal the scale of the coordination: In 2015, Vanguard’s many different in-
vestment funds voted in concert in all but 6 votes out of 100,000.72  Similarly, 
BlackRock voted its shares asynchronously on only 18 out of 100,000 pro-
posals.73  Likewise, State Street deviated on just 195 out of 100,000 pro-
posals.74  Such figures reveal that it is very rare indeed for index fund pro-
viders to vote subsets of shares in different ways.75 
                                                          
 70.  See, e.g., STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53, at 12 (“All voting and en-
gagement activities are centralized within the stewardship team, irrespective of investment strategy 
or geographic region.”); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of Institutional 
Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 95 (2017) (“[T]he voting and stewardship decisions of mutual 
fund families are commonly concentrated in a single corporate governance department or proxy 
voting department of the investment manager . . . .”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the 
Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate 
Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1915 (2017) (“[T]he fund family will, at best, establish a 
centralized voting unit comprised of comparatively less expensive employees, who will develop 
voting policies and make sure government mandates for voting are satisfied.”). 
 71.  See Strine, supra note 70, at 1913–14 (explaining that index fund owners get “no inde-
pendent thinking at all or any separate voice” and that the “index fund will vote the same way as 
the actively traded funds in the fund complex”); Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part 
I, supra note 26, at 14 (noting that there is no “legal prohibition against an advisory firm from 
voting, monitoring, or engaging with a given portfolio company on behalf of all of its funds in an 
identical and coordinated manner” and that this means such a company’s senior management con-
trols how all of its shares are exercised).  
 72.  Fichtner et al., supra note 3, at 316–17. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  But see Dawn Lim & Cara Lombardo, Vanguard Is Handing Over Some of Its Voting 
Power, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2019, 7:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguard-is-handing-
over-some-of-its-voting-power-11556190120 (noting that firms which manage Vanguard’s active 
equity funds will receive the power to vote on certain issues, a change affecting approximately 9% 
of Vanguard’s assets). 
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The investment stewardship teams making voting decisions are gener-
ally quite small in size: Vanguard has about twenty employees76 who share 
responsibility for researching and voting on 168,786 ballot items,77 or 
roughly 8400 per employee.  Similarly, BlackRock employs thirty-six people 
to analyze and vote on 158,942 proposals, or nearly 4500 issues per em-
ployee.78  Finally, State Street has twelve people on staff79 to investigate and 
vote on over 154,458 proposals,80 an average of about 12,900 issues per em-
ployee.  These small teams must research, analyze, and draw conclusions on 
a huge number of proposals of a large number of companies, a task impossi-
ble to do with any great specificity.81 
To reduce this enormous burden, the corporate governance teams at 
each of these firms greatly simplify voting decisions by crafting a set of ge-
neric voting guidelines, which they follow closely in individual contests.82  
The policies crafted by these governance teams are remarkably consistent 
across the Big Three, a consistency that has emerged despite the lack of con-
sensus on best practices for corporate governance.83  All three firms support 
director independence, seek to tie executive compensation to long-term per-
formance, oppose antitakeover provisions, and generally oppose major 
changes to corporate structure.84  Additionally, representatives from one in-
dex fund provider regularly meet with representatives from other index fund 
providers.85  In these discussions, the index fund representatives develop and 
discuss approaches to corporate governance, a process that yields “significant 
coordination over many if not all topics on which shareholders routinely 
vote.”86  As with the concentration of vote decisionmaking at the firm level 
rather than the fund level, the unity between investment advisory firms has 
the effect of strengthening the voice of the Big Three, for better or worse. 
                                                          
 76.  VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT 2 
(2017), https://www.wlrk.com/docs/VanguardInvestmentStewardshipReport2017.pdf (“Our team 
has doubled in size since 2015, and we now stand at more than [twenty] analysts, researchers, and 
operations team members.”). 
 77.  VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP , supra note 53, at 7. 
 78.  BLACKROCK, supra note 53, at 4, 20. 
 79.  E-mail from Olivia Offner, Vice President, State Street Media Relations, to Caleb N. Grif-
fin, Assistant Professor, Belmont University College of Law (Feb. 12, 2019, 12:24 PM) (on file 
with author).  
 80.  STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53. 
 81.  Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 516 
(2018). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15. 
 86.  Id. 
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An advantage of reliance upon generalized voting guidelines is that such 
an approach reduces the costs of engagement and research, a valuable feature 
for funds that prize themselves on their low fees.87  These guidelines also 
provide index fund providers with influence over corporate actors, as these 
guidelines send signals to portfolio companies, which may preemptively 
comply with the guidelines before a vote is even called.88  Further, such an 
approach complies with federal regulations, which require investment advis-
ers exercising voting authority over an index funds’ proxies to “[a]dopt and 
implement written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to 
ensure that [the investment advisers] vote client securities in the best interest 
of clients.”89 
However, critics argue that this type of generalized, “unthinking” cor-
porate governance “will make many companies worse off.”90  Common cri-
tiques of this approach to corporate governance include that it concentrates 
too much power in the hands of too few individuals,91 favors certain behav-
iors and activities that are not necessarily superior,92 and empowers individ-
uals with insufficient incentives to promote optimal corporate governance.93 
Corporate governance teams also simplify their task by availing them-
selves of the services of outside proxy advisory firms.  These firms provide 
research support and voting recommendations to their clients.  Like the index 
fund industry itself, the proxy advisory market is highly concentrated.  Only 
two firms, Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass Lewis, con-
trol a staggering 97% of the market for proxy advisory services.94  Unsurpris-
ingly, then, all of the Big Three rely upon the recommendations and research 
                                                          
 87.  Lund, supra note 81, at 512. 
 88.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15. 
 89.  17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2016).  
 90.  Lund, supra note 81, at 495. 
 91.  See, e.g., Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 25, at 10 (warn-
ing that indexation is concentrating power in the hands of a small number of individuals); Fisch et 
al., supra note 48, at 37–41 (arguing that indexation is causing a worrisome concentration of stock 
ownership). 
 92.  Lund, supra note 81, at 518 (arguing that good corporate governance is “endogenous to the 
particular firm” and that the failure of index funds to vote with specificity is therefore inconsistent 
with good corporate governance).  
 93.  See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 70, at 90 (arguing “that index funds have especially 
poor incentives to engage in stewardship activities that could improve governance and increase 
value”); Lund, supra note 81, at 512 (“[U]nlike active funds, passive funds have no financial incen-
tive to monitor management or invest in governance interventions.”); Coates, The Future of Corpo-
rate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15 (stating “index provider managers have very weak 
incentives to use their control, at least as conventionally understood”). 
 94.  Bryce C. Tingle, The Agency Cost Case for Regulating Proxy Advisory Firms, 49 U.B.C. 
L. REV. 725, 743 (2016). 
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of ISS, and BlackRock also utilizes Glass Lewis for research support.95  Out-
sourcing some of the burden for researching and casting proxy votes has the 
potential to reduce costs, simplify voting, and provide an outside and poten-
tially objective perspective on important decisions for low-cost index 
funds.96  However, proxy advisors have also been critiqued for a number of 
faults, including a lack of transparency,97 simplistic research methods,98 the 
lack of competition in the market for proxy advisory services,99 and insuffi-
cient incentives.100  The fact that many of these critiques mimic critiques of 
the corporate governance teams themselves suggests that proxy advisory 
firms may not be a sufficient tool to overcome the limitations facing index 
funds in casting their votes. 
Overall, then, the nature of index fund voting can be summarized as 
unified (as votes are typically cast in unison within an individual firm), syn-
chronous (as votes are typically cast similarly across the Big Three), concen-
trated (as decision-making power is in the hands of a small group), and non-
specific (as voting decisions generally adhere to a set of generalized princi-
ples).  The advantages of these features in reducing costs, simplifying the 
voting process, and strengthening the voice of index funds also entail corre-
sponding costs in the form of reducing the thoroughness of analysis, decreas-
ing specificity of recommendations, and potentially over-empowering indi-
viduals with insufficient incentives to promote optimal corporate 
governance.  Moreover, the unified, synchronous, concentrated, and non-spe-
cific voting decisions of the Big Three risk creating and enforcing a corporate 
                                                          
 95.  Lund, supra note 81, at 516. 
 96.  See The Investment Stewardship Ecosystem, BLACKROCK VIEWPOINT (July 12, 2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-investment-stewardship-
ecosystem-july-2018.pdf (extolling the benefits of proxy advisors); see also Bebchuk et al., supra 
note 70, at 109 (raising the concern that “a reduction in the activities of proxy advisors would not 
be offset by increased spending on analysis by institutional investors sufficient to maintain even 
their current levels of monitoring”). 
 97.  See, e.g., Rachel McTague, Chamber Approaches RiskMetrics with Proposed Changes to 
Policy-Setting, 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 569, 589 (2008) (noting that the proxy firm’s “lack of trans-
parency” has led the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to describe ISS’s process for making proxy rec-
ommendations as a “black box”). 
 98.  See, e.g., Charles M. Nathan et al., Proxy Advisory Business: Apotheosis or Apogee?, 
CORP. GOVERNANCE COMMENT. (Latham & Watkins LLP, Los Angeles, Cal.), Mar. 2011, at 1, 4, 
https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub4042_1.pdf (“In essence, proxy advisory firms 
cope with their problem of large numbers and seasonality through automation of as large a portion 
of the vote recommendation process as feasible.”). 
 99.  See, e.g., Asaf Eckstein & Sharon Hannes, A Long/Short Incentive Scheme for Proxy Ad-
visory Firms, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 787, 797–98 (2018) (noting the “extreme lack of competi-
tion in the proxy advisory industry” and the importance of competition for “improving the quality 
of proxy advisory services”).  
 100.  See, e.g., id. at 817 (proposing ways to strengthen proxy advisory firms’ incentives to pro-
duce high-quality research). 
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governance monoculture.  Such voting may advance a set of corporate gov-
ernance principles that do not necessarily constitute best practices and that 
may not reflect the true interests and values of the index fund investors them-
selves. 
B.  What Index Fund Voting Is Not 
As the foregoing has decidedly emphasized, index fund voting can be 
characterized by its remarkable uniformity, a uniformity which can be ob-
served in the concentration of voting power in the hands of a single team at 
each index fund provider, in the coordinated way in which the individual 
funds of a given index fund provider tend to vote, and in the coordinated 
preferences and priorities of the Big Three index fund providers.  In stark 
contrast, however, the millions of individual index fund investors on behalf 
of whom the Big Three cast their votes exhibit remarkable diversity.101  In-
deed, index funds hold the funds of a sizable subset of the American investing 
public, and index fund investors reflect the diverse characteristics of society 
at large.  Index fund investors include the young, the middle aged, and the 
elderly.  Some are mere days away from retirement, while others are decades 
away.102  Index fund investors include politically liberal, politically conserva-
tive, and apolitical individuals, and these political affiliations likely would 
correlate to differing opinions on corporate political speech, political dona-
tions, and other more general matters.103  Given the option, some index funds 
investors would assuredly sacrifice financial gains for environmental or so-
cial benefits while others would not choose to do so.104  Even Vanguard’s 
                                                          
 101.  See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 561, 577 (2006) (pointing out that shareholders come “in different flavors”); Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 547, 557 (2003) (referencing “shareholders’ widely divergent interests” as a problem for di-
rectors in making consensus decisions); Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate 
Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1591 (1993) (arguing that directors should consider divergent 
shareholder interests in their decisionmaking); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge 
v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 174 (2008) (noting that shareholders have differing interests). 
 102.  Anabtawi, supra note 101, at 579 (pointing out that shareholders have divergent time ho-
rizons for their investments). 
 103.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who 
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 111–17 (2010) (discussing potential solutions to situations where 
shareholders disagree on political issues such as corporate political speech). 
 104.  Indeed, many index fund investors are already opting to invest in funds specifically desig-
nated as socially responsible.  For instance, investors have already chosen to invest $4.4 billion in 
Vanguard’s “Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund,” (a “low-cost fund [that] seeks to track a bench-
mark of large- and mid-capitalization stocks that have been screened for certain social, human 
rights, and environmental criteria” intended to serve investors who “choose investments based on 
social and personal beliefs”).  Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund Investor Shares, VANGUARD, 
https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/profile/VFTSX (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).  Despite 
this supposed social orientation, however, it is likely that socially responsible index funds vote in 
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investment stewardship team recognizes that its “shareholders have a wide 
range of ideological perspectives.”105  Index fund investors also vary substan-
tially in their financial situation—some are rich while some are of modest 
means.106  Based upon the heterogeneity of investors themselves, it is unde-
niable that the individual interests and preferences of individual index fund 
investors can differ significantly from the uniform approaches taken on their 
behalf by index funds and their corporate governance teams.107 
With that in mind, index fund voting can also be usefully described by 
what it is not.  Index fund voting is not varied.  Although there is no consen-
sus on corporate governance, the Big Three have taken a consensus approach 
to corporate governance.108  Consequently, index fund investors lack the abil-
ity to express voting preferences by selecting a particular index fund pro-
vider. 
Index fund voting is not differentiated.  The various individual funds 
owned by a given investment company typically vote in unison, despite con-
siderable variation in their clientele and holdings.109  Indeed, even when in-
vestors have opted to invest in a fund with an expressed commitment to a 
social value, such as environmental sustainability, the fund often fails to vote 
in line with that commitment.110  This lack of variation means that individual 
investors are also unable to express voting preferences through their selection 
of individual funds. 
Further, index fund voting is not individualized.  It does not reflect the 
individual preferences of the actual index fund investors, including their 
unique financial circumstances, political and social values, priorities, invest-
ment time horizon, or employment situation.  Rather, the votes controlled by 
                                                          
concert with all of Vanguards other index funds, even on questions that relate to social, human 
rights, and environmental matters.  See Strine, supra note 70, at 1936. 
 105.  VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53, at 2. 
 106.  The mean income of families with some number of holdings sheds light on the diversity in 
income that can be exhibited by investors.  Those in the bottom 20% had a mean income of $15,100 
while those in the top 10% had a mean income $260,200, based upon data from 2016.  FED. 
RESERVE, 2016 SCF CHARTBOOK 8 (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/Bulletin-
Charts.pdf.  Though this data includes individuals with a great variety of holdings and not solely 
index funds, it is likely that index fund investors would similarly include individuals with diverse 
financial circumstances. 
 107.  Anabtawi, supra note 101, at 577–92 (2006) (detailing key differences between sharehold-
ers and how those differences would result in different priorities for firm management); William B. 
Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1999) (“[I]nstitutional investors’ and individual shareholders’ interests 
may diverge.”). 
 108.  Lund, supra note 81, at 516. 
 109.  Strine, supra note 70, at 1913–14. 
 110.  Id. at 1913 (noting that “[i]f you invest in a fund that is supposed to be ‘socially responsi-
ble,’ it is likely to vote on issues in exactly the same way as the other funds in the fund family, 
however inconsistent that is with the fund’s stated purpose”). 
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index funds are almost exclusively cast in unison.111  An individual human 
investor cannot rely upon an index fund provider to even be aware of his or 
her individual interests when making voting decisions, let alone to act upon 
those interests. 
As it stands, the human investors who collectively make up index funds 
have virtually no way to ensure that the votes cast on their behalf are cast in 
line with their preferences or priorities.  Heterogeneity does not exist in the 
way an individual’s proportional shares are voted, nor does it meaningfully 
exist at the fund level or even the index fund provider level.  Thus, human 
investors are well characterized as “not so much citizens of the corporate 
governance republic as they are the voiceless and choiceless many.”112  They 
lack both a direct voice on corporate governance matters as well as the op-
portunity to make even an indirect or constrained choice. 
V.  IMPACT OF INDEX FUND VOTING ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The concentration of voting power in the hands of index funds’ corpo-
rate governance teams represents a significant departure from the traditional 
management and ownership structure of corporations.  This Part explores the 
key effects of this profound change.  Section V.A explores how the rise in 
index fund power has resulted in a transformation from the classic Berle-
Means corporation characterized by the separation of ownership and control 
to a situation of minority control for most large publicly-traded corporations.  
Section V.B summarizes key empirical studies on the real-world effects of 
index funds’ control.  Section V.C discusses academics and commentators’ 
increasing concern over index funds’ governance influence.  Section V.D cat-
egorizes those key concerns. 
A.  Index Funds and “Minority Control” 
Since Professors Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means first explicated the 
concept in their seminal 1932 text, modern corporations have been thought 
to feature as a primary characteristic the separation of ownership and control, 
where the shareholder owners have substantial ownership and minimal con-
trol and the managers have substantial control and minimal ownership.113  
This separation of ownership and control has been taken as a given in virtu-
ally all corporate law scholarship, with scholars focusing on mitigating the 
                                                          
 111.  Id. at 1913–14. 
 112.  Id. at 1872. 
 113.  ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 2–5 (1932). 
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agency costs stemming from this separation.114  However, Berle and Means 
also identified an important exception to the separation of ownership and 
control assumed in a modern corporation.115  They demonstrated that the sep-
aration of ownership and control hinged upon the dispersed ownership of 
stocks—even a relatively small, non-majority, block of stocks could give its 
owner effective control over the enterprise as a whole.116  Berle and Means 
described corporations with substantial control in the hands of a single indi-
vidual as minority-controlled corporations, which they distinguished from 
management-controlled corporations.117 
How much control in the hands of a single owner transforms a corpora-
tion from a manger-controlled to a minority-controlled corporation?  Berle 
and Means noted that the “dividing line between control by a minority inter-
est and control by management is not clear.”118  However, they classified 
corporations according to the following guidelines: Corporations with below 
5% minority ownership constituted management control, corporations with 
5–20% minority ownership constituted joint minority and management con-
trol, and corporations with 20–50% minority ownership constituted minority 
control.119  For his part, John Bogle deemed 30% ownership to be the thresh-
old for “effective control” over a corporation.120 
As index funds have gained control over an increasingly large percent-
age of the shares of individual corporations, they have almost decidedly en-
tered into the territory labeled by Berle and Means as constituting “joint mi-
nority and management control” for most large corporations and may be 
nearing Bogle’s threshold for “effective control.”121  If, as is predicted,122 
index funds continue to draw additional investment, it is possible that they 
will increasingly wield pure “minority control” or perhaps even majority con-
trol over a substantial swath of corporate America.123 
                                                          
 114.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 671, 672 (1995).  
 115.  BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra note 113, at 80–84. 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. at 84–88. 
 118.  Id. at 85. 
 119.  Id. at 109. 
 120.  Bogle, supra note 20 (stating that in the near future, “the ‘Big Three’ might own 30% or 
more of the U.S. stock market—effective control”). 
 121.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 13 (stating “indexed 
funds now own more than 20% and perhaps 30% or more of nearly all U.S. public companies”). 
 122.  Bogle, supra note 20. 
 123.  See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 13 (“[E]ven if 
the trend flattens, the majority of most companies will soon be owned by indexed funds.”); Hun-
nicutt, supra note 33 (predicting that index funds will hold over half of the market by 2024). 
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B.  Empirical Studies of the Impact of Index Funds’ “Minority 
Control” 
The real-world impact of index funds’ control can already be observed 
in some empirical analyses of corporate behaviors.  At a general level, several 
scholars have provided empirical confirmation that index funds do actively 
wield their considerable power over corporate decisionmakers.  For example, 
Professor Joseph A. McCahery and his co-authors use a survey methodology 
to confirm that institutional investors actively deploy their influence to shape 
corporate governance decisions and conduct direct engagements with man-
agement to shape behaviors.124  They also found that long-term investors 
(such as index fund investors) intervene more intensely than their short-term 
counterparts.125 
Whether these engagement efforts yield positive or negative benefits is 
less clear in the literature.  On the one hand, some scholars have found posi-
tive benefits from index fund providers’ engagement in corporate governance 
activities.  For instance, Professor Ian Appel and his co-authors demonstrate 
that increased index fund ownership in a given corporation is associated with 
(1) an increased share of independent directors; (2) an increased likelihood 
that takeover defenses, particularly poison pills and restrictions on the ability 
to call special meetings, will be removed; and (3) a decreased likelihood that 
firms will have unequal voting rights (such as a dual class share structure).126  
The authors found that these interventions were associated with improved 
long-term performance.127  Likewise, Professor Jarrad Harford and his co-
authors demonstrate that index fund investment is correlated with strong cor-
porate governance, reduced managerial misbehaviors, decreased external fi-
nancing, increased payouts to shareholders, and overall higher returns for 
shareholders.128 
On the other hand, scholars have also identified quantifiable harms as-
sociated with index funds’ growing power over corporate governance efforts.  
Economist Jonathan Brogaard and his co-authors suggest, based on the effect 
of introducing indexing in the commodities markets, that index fund control 
over a given industry may be associated with worse production decisions, 
lower profits, and higher costs.129  Additionally, Economist José Azar and his 
                                                          
 124.  Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of 
Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2929 (2016).  
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Ian R. Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 114 
(2016). 
 127.  Id. at 129.  
 128.  Jarrad Harford et al., Do Long-Term Investors Improve Corporate Decision Making?, 50 
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colleagues have suggested that index funds’ considerable influence on natu-
ral competitor firms has demonstrably reduced competition and therefore re-
sulted in higher prices for consumers.130  Though they focus on the airline 
industry as a test case, they suggest that these outcomes may be observed 
across the economy as a whole.131  Cornelius Schmidt and Rüdiger Fahlen-
brach also find negative consequences from increased index fund owner-
ship.132  They demonstrate such ownership to be associated with increased 
CEO power, fewer independent director appointments, decreased returns af-
ter appointments of new independent directors, and qualitatively worse mer-
ger and acquisition activity.133 
Thus, the literature seems to provide convincing evidence that index 
funds are influencing the ways in which corporations are managed.  Whether 
that influence is for better or worse is unclear, and it is certainly possible that 
index funds yield mixed effects.  At any rate, the data do not provide clear 
indication that index funds are either exclusively beneficial or exclusively 
harmful. 
C.  Concern over “Minority Control” 
At the descriptive level, a whole chorus of voices have emerged express-
ing concern that the increased concentration of power over corporate govern-
ance in the hands of index funds will produce negative outcomes for investors 
at large and for the economy as a whole.  These concerns have been expressed 
in the popular press.  John Bogle himself issued a warning in The Wall Street 
Journal about the growing power of index funds: “If historical trends con-
tinue, a handful of giant institutional investors will one day hold voting con-
trol of virtually every large U.S. corporation.  Public policy cannot ignore 
this growing dominance . . . .”134  These concerns have been echoed by aca-
demics, including Professor John Coates, who recently issued a similar pre-
diction: 
[I]ndex providers are increasingly a, if not the, dominant force in 
governance of public companies.  As they accumulate more and 
more assets, they accumulate more and more votes.  Those votes, 
even if coupled to tiny staffs and modest expenditures on monitor-
ing, create real power.  That power creates a legitimacy and ac-
countability challenge.  The power is held by agents, and because 
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of how important large public companies are, those agents have 
increasing influence over the economy, society, and both the inputs 
and outputs of the political system.  For a dozen individuals to hold 
such power . . . is not a sustainable political or legal equilibrium.135 
As these statements indicate, there is growing concern over the rising power 
of index funds and increased interest in taking steps to manage or control that 
power. 
D.  Key Concerns 
Concerns about the rising power of index funds vary, and they some-
times contradict one another other.  However, it is possible to compile a dis-
crete list of key concerns regarding the increased power of index funds, which 
include: (1) the inherent problems with concentration of power, (2) homoge-
neity in the voting and standard setting promoted by index fund providers, 
(3) insufficient incentives and resources to ensure that power is well-used, 
(4) the problematic separation of ownership from ownership that is a funda-
mental feature of the structure of index funds, (5) agency costs accompanying 
this separation of ownership from ownership, (6) competitive effects, and (7) 
potential passivity.  These concerns will be discussed in turn in the subsec-
tions that follow. 
1.  Concentration of Power 
A fundamental concern centers on the inherent problems associated with 
concentration of power.136  Vesting substantial control over corporate Amer-
ica in the hands of a few individuals increases the incentive and opportunity 
for those individuals to use that power to promote self-interested aims.137  
Additionally, even where these individuals mean well, they may make incor-
rect judgments about the optimal course of action, and the negative conse-
quences of their misjudgments will be magnified by the scale of their power 
in the marketplace.138 
                                                          
 135.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 19. 
 136.  Bogle, supra note 20. 
 137.  See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 18–19 (describ-
ing how index fund managers may be able to use their positions of power to obtain private benefits, 
such as political office or business relationships with the corporations in which they vote, in a way 
that has the potential to harm index fund investors). 
 138.  See Lund, supra note 81, at 516. 
 
2020] WE THREE KINGS 975 
At the same time, some commentators see concentration of power as a 
potential benefit, given that it has the potential to overcome the rational apa-
thy of individual investors.139  Additionally, the fact that this power is con-
centrated in the hands of individuals (ideally) concerned with the welfare of 
ordinary investors means that this power may be used as a counterweight to 
the power of hedge funds, short term investors, self-interested investors, and 
self-dealing directors.140  Thus, the challenge is to address concerns about 
concentration of power “without losing the corporate governance benefits of 
increased monitoring that flow from less dispersed ownership.”141 
2.  Homogeneity in Voting and Standard Setting 
A related concern involves the tendency for the shares controlled by in-
dex funds to vote in similar ways both at the fund level and at the index fund 
provider level.  As mentioned above, the Big Three tend to vote all shares 
controlled by their many individual funds and adhere to similar principles of 
“good corporate governance.”142  Problematically, however, there is no con-
sensus on best practices of corporate governance.143  It may be that all or 
some of the Big Three’s policies do not promote optimal outcomes for index 
fund investors or the economy as a whole, as is potentially suggested by some 
of the negative economic analyses of index funds and their effects on corpo-
rate behaviors.144 
Because there is no way for an individual investor to express a prefer-
ence for a certain behavior or approach to corporate governance (such an op-
tion does not exist at the individual vote level, the fund level, or even the 
index fund provider level), there is no way for individual shareholders to alter 
the behavior of index funds or to express a preference towards different ap-
proaches and priorities.145  This means that while portfolio companies will 
attempt to win the approval of index fund providers by adhering to their prin-
ciples of corporate governance, the index fund providers themselves are un-
                                                          
 139.  Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 821–22 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 520, 575–91 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside 
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 879 (1991). 
 140.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 13. 
 141.  Id. at 22. 
 142.  See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 143.  See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (referring to “the protean nature of ideal corporate governance practices, par-
ticularly over an era that has included the Enron and WorldCom debacles”); Lund, supra note 81, 
at 516 (referring to the lack of consensus on principles of corporate governance). 
 144.  See supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text. 
 145.  See supra Section IV.A. 
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der little competitive pressure to pursue optimal principles of corporate gov-
ernance.  This has the effect of entrenching the priorities of the Big Three—
even though they may not be optimal—rather than permitting a competitive 
marketplace wherein firms can distinguish themselves by their superior per-
formance.  Some scholars have identified the corporate governance standards 
of the Big Three and their proxy advisors as “close to binding” on company 
management.146 
3.  Insufficient Incentives and Resources 
Third, a related concern is that index fund agents have insufficient in-
centives and resources to yield their power over firms in a manner conducive 
to optimal corporate governance.  The lack of incentives stems from a variety 
of causes.  One cause is that index fund corporate governance employees do 
not experience a significant direct benefit when a portfolio company does 
well (or the reverse if a company does poorly).147  A second cause is that 
index funds are committed to owning all companies in the index regardless 
of how any individual company performs.148  A third cause is that index funds 
compete on fees and therefore have an incentive to minimize the expenses 
associated with their corporate governance efforts.149  Altogether, the lack of 
incentives and resources raises concerns that index fund providers are ill-
poised and insufficiently motivated to promote optimal corporate govern-
ance, which creates a particularly problematic situation given the scale of 
their influence. 
                                                          
 146.  See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Share-
holders Be Shareholders 1, 5 (Jan. 31, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://www-cdn.law.stan-
ford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/1-Edward-Rock-Cover-Sheet-2019-01-15-at-10.51.07-
AM.pdf.  
 147.  See Bebchuk et al., supra note 70, at 93 (noting that index fund providers “invest other 
people’s money,” which reduces their incentives to promote optimal governance); Coates, The Fu-
ture of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 15 (noting index fund providers have “weak 
incentives to do anything” given their fee structure). 
 148.  Lund, supra note 81, at 511 (“Because a passive fund seeks only to match the performance 
of a market index—not outperform it—the fund lacks a financial incentive to ensure that the com-
panies in their portfolio are well run.”). 
 149.  See Bebchuk et al., supra note 70, at 93 (arguing that index fund providers have incentives 
to underspend on stewardship); Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Ex-
cluded Retail Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 52 (2017) (“Some institutions, such as index funds, 
compete by minimizing their operating expenses, and devoting substantial resources to governance 
research may be in tension with that business model.”). 
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4.  Separation of Ownership from Ownership 
A fourth concern relates to what is known as the “separation of owner-
ship from ownership.”150  This concept refers to the fact that money manag-
ers, including index fund providers, wield the power to vote on behalf of their 
clients, but that these agents do not necessarily have interests aligned with 
their investors.151  Indeed, these managers may not even know their clients’ 
interests and priorities, and they do not currently undertake any efforts to 
ascertain the true perspectives of individual clients.152  Though they are 
charged with acting on behalf of clients, they do so by considering the inter-
ests of an abstract, generalized investor rather than dealing with the particular 
nuances of their actual client base.153 
5.  Agency Costs 
A related concern is that the interests of index fund management are 
divorced from those of the actual human investors controlling the shares.  
This means that these managers might use their considerable power to pursue 
self-interested ends or private benefits, rather than the best interests of index 
fund investors.154  Such benefits might include establishing relationships and 
connections that would advance their career, furthering their clout in aca-
demic or social circles, positioning themselves to run for political office, pur-
suing personal values in their corporate governance efforts, or other such ac-
tions.  Because index funds have substantial power and vest that power in 
small corporate governance teams, those concerns are magnified. 
6.  Competitive Effects 
A sixth concern is that the rising power of index funds is producing an-
ticompetitive effects.155  It is feared that by reducing pressure on natural com-
petitors through their large ownership shares in each of the competing firms, 
index funds are providing these entities with the opportunity to raise prices.156  
These price increases are detrimental for consumers and the economy overall, 
                                                          
 150.  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the 
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449 (2014). 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  See Strine, supra note 70, at 1913–14. 
 153.  See id. 
 154.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 18. 
 155.  See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1307 (2016); 
Posner et al., supra note 41, at 669–70. 
 156.  Posner et al., supra note 41, at 669. 
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and they may even be a net negative for index fund investors themselves.157  
Economic research suggests that these abstract concerns may be born out in 
the real world, with scholars associating index fund ownership with price in-
creases in both the airline158 and commodities industries.159 
7.  Passivity 
A seventh concern is passivity on the part of index fund managers.  
Some commentators fear that, because index fund managers and corporate 
governance teams do not have strong incentives to engage in good corporate 
governance, they will be passive with regards to corporate governance.160  
This passivity, in turn, may decrease monitoring of firms by shareholders, 
reduce incentives for good corporate governance, and increase opportunities 
for mismanagement and self-dealing on the part of corporate directors and 
managers.161  This concern, of course, runs counter to concerns about the 
index funds’ increasing power over corporate governance standards but re-
flects the same underlying fear: The growth of index fund investing will re-
sult in worse corporate governance and worse monitoring of portfolio com-
panies. 
VI.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 
Given the increasing attention to this issue, a number of corporate law 
scholars have proposed policy solutions that attempt to mitigate concerns 
over the growing concentration of power in the hands of index funds or to 
preserve the status quo.  This Article responds to these proposals in the sub-
sections that follow. 
                                                          
 157.  For a discussion of how price increases may disserve ordinary investors even if they pro-
duce share price gains, see Caleb N. Griffin, Mergers Aren’t So Black & White, 43 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 213 (2019). 
 158.  Azar et al., supra note 130, at 1516. 
 159.  Brogaard et al., supra note 129. 
 160.  See, e.g., Ashley Alder, Chief Exec. Officer, Sec. & Future Comm’n, Keynote Speech at 
Companies Registry Corporate Governance Roundtable 1 (Mar. 13, 2017) (transcript available at 
http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/ER/PDF/Speeches/AIA_20170313.pdf) (“If a large slice of insti-
tutional investor money is passive, this could mean that few of them have any interest in holding 
boards to account.  The concern is that if boards do not feel accountable to shareholders, incentives 
for good governance could wither away.”); Michael Blanding, Vanguard, Trian and the Problem 
with ‘Passive’ Index Funds, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/passive-index-fund-leaders-push-for-shareholder-reforms (identifying 
concerns that “[i]ndex funds are the major shareholders in many large- and medium-sized public 
companies, but their passive investment nature offers few checks on those companies’ executives.”). 
 161.  Alder, supra note 160, at 5. 
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A.  No Action 
One potential course of action would be to do nothing.162  Such an ap-
proach does not necessitate pretending that there are no problems with the 
status quo but, rather, deciding that the status quo is superior to any proposed 
solution.  Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock endorse such a course 
of action because they believe that “no proposed fix can do better” than the 
status quo.163 
However, it is unclear that index fund investors are doing a sufficient 
job of advancing index fund investors’ actual interests and values.  The sim-
plified voting guidelines crafted and utilized by index fund stewardship teams 
are not tailored to individual clients’ situations or values, and there is no way 
for those investors to express a preference because of the homogeneity in the 
corporate governance approaches at the fund and index provider level.  Ad-
ditionally, one of Kahan and Rocks’ rationales for their proposal to preserve 
the status quo is that managers at the Big Three index funds have “direct 
financial incentives to vote intelligently that are typically larger than any 
other shareholder,”164 signaling out individual investors as one group with far 
smaller financial incentives.165  However, relying upon dollar value of the 
financial stake is an imperfect way to measure incentives.  For example, it 
seems unlikely that a billionaire would be ten times more motivated by a raise 
of fifty dollars per hour than a person of modest means would be motivated 
by a raise of five dollars per hour.  Though the dollar value of financial in-
centives at stake matters, so does the relative impact of that financial stake 
on a given portfolio, whether those financial incentives are internalized by 
any individual actor, and whether financial gains are accompanied by any 
negative externalities.166 
B.  Stewardship Codes 
A second approach to the corporate governance challenges implicated 
by the growing power of index funds would be to implement voluntary stew-
ardship codes.167  These stewardship codes would commit adherents to 
                                                          
 162.  Kahan & Rock, supra note 146, at 55 (analyzing the status quo, noting advantages and 
disadvantages of index funds’ power, considering alternatives and concluding “[u]ntil and unless 
there is a proposal that would significantly improve matters, we should just let shareholders be 
shareholders”). 
 163.  Id. at 55. 
 164.  Id. at 1. 
 165.  Id. at 16. 
 166.  See Fisch, supra note 149, at 45 (stating that “[e]ven if a retail investor’s stake in a voting 
outcome is relatively small, the underlying investment is likely to be economically meaningful to 
that shareholder,” a rationale which also applies to the investments of index fund investors). 
 167.  See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 20. 
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providing periodic reporting on stewardship activities and to increasing trans-
parency.168  However, as voluntary commitments, these codes would likely 
be modest in their effects.169  Additionally, the corporate governance teams 
for all of the Big Three index fund providers already provide annual reporting 
on their investment stewardship activities (including engagements),170 and 
they are relatively transparent about their corporate governance priorities171 
and their actual voting behaviors.172  In fact, registered management invest-
ment companies are already required to disclose both the policies and proce-
dures guiding their voting decisions and their actual voting record.173  As 
such, efforts to increase transparency and disclosures would likely not pre-
sent a significant departure from the status quo.  Overall, stewardship codes 
seem unlikely to address the fundamental concerns with index fund voting 
described in Section V.D., though they would be a step to further highlight 
the importance of transparency and disclosure. 
                                                          
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 20–21. 
 170.  Vanguard has its 2018 investment stewardship report available as of the time of this writ-
ing.  It is a forty-four page document summarizing Vanguard’s four pillars of good governance, its 
structure and approach to investment stewardship, and case studies highlighting its efforts to engage 
directly with corporations.  See VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53.  Likewise, 
BlackRock also has its 2018 investment stewardship report publicly available at the time of this 
writing.  The report summarizes BlackRock’s investment stewardship efforts over the past year and 
details the company’s principles, priorities, and engagement commentaries.  BLACKROCK, supra 
note 53.  State Street also provides data and analysis on its investment stewardship activities in its 
annual report.  This document also summarizes State Street’s stewardship philosophy and objec-
tives.  STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53. 
 171.  Vanguard provides a statement of its voting guidelines on its website.  See VANGUARD 
INVESTMENT GROUP, VANGUARD’S PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES (2019), https://about.van-
guard.com/investment-stewardship/portfolio-company-resources/proxy_voting_guidelines.pdf.  
Likewise, BlackRock similarly publishes its proxy voting guidelines.  See BLACKROCK, 
BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PROXY VOTING 
GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES (2020), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-
sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf.  Likewise, State Street also provides digital ac-
cess to its engagement and voting guidelines for its holdings in various world regions online.  See 
STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, ASSET STEWARDSHIP (2020), https://www.ssga.com/us/en/in-
dividual/etfs/insights/informing-better-decisions-with-esg.  
 172.  Vanguard makes the details of all proxy votes cast freely available online.  See How Our 
Funds Voted, VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, https://about.vanguard.com/investment-steward-
ship/how-our-funds-voted/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).  Likewise, BlackRock makes its complete 
vote records available online.  See Investment Stewardship, BLACKROCK 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/investment-stewardship#our-responsibility (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2020).  State Street also provides digital access to its engagement and voting guide-
lines for its holdings in various world regions online.  See Asset Stewardship, STATE STREET 
GLOBAL ADVISORS, https://www.ssga.com/global/en/about-us/asset-stewardship.html (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2020). 
 173.  Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6566 (Feb. 7, 2003). 
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C.  Public Enforcement or Auditing of Good Stewardship 
A third, related proposal to address the concentration of power in the 
hands of index funds involves enforcement of good stewardship practices, 
such as transparency and disclosure, through legal obligations and/or audit-
ing.174  Like the prior approach, however, these legal obligations would be 
unlikely to significantly change the status quo, as the existing index fund pro-
viders are relatively transparent and are under some degree of legal obligation 
to continue that transparency.175  The costs accompanying auditing or other 
enforcement mechanisms might also raise the prices of index fund services, 
which would negatively affect index fund investors.176  Overall, enforcement 
of good stewardship practices would not provide a substantial change from 
the status quo, and it is unclear whether such an uncertain benefit would be 
worth the associated costs. 
D.  Loss of Voting Power 
Another, far more drastic, policy proposal calls for restricting passive 
funds from voting their shares entirely.177  Such action would have two pri-
mary effects: (1) eliminating the voice of passive investors and (2) thereby 
increasing the voice of remaining shareholders.178  Though such a proposition 
would of course successfully reduce the voting power of index funds (to 
zero), it would produce a number of deleterious consequences.  First, such 
action would disenfranchise a huge swath of investors, undermining the 
shareholder franchise itself—the “ideological underpinning” of corporate 
law.179  If, as predicted, passive investing overtakes active investing in the 
next few years, this would result in the disenfranchisement of the majority of 
all equity investors.180 
Second, such action would empower activist investors, hedge funds, and 
other potentially short-term-oriented investors by increasing the impact of 
their vote.181  To the extent the remaining investors have interests adverse to 
                                                          
 174.  See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 21. 
 175.  See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 176.  See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 21. 
 177.  See Lund, supra note 81, at 528–30. 
 178.  See id. at 529–530. 
 179.  Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 180.  Hunnicutt, supra note 33 (predicting that index funds will hold over half of the market by 
2024). 
 181.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 21. 
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index fund investors,182 such action would harm index fund investors by def-
inition.183  Additionally, in comparison to index fund investors who tend to 
be more interested in long-term performance and overall economic stabil-
ity,184 activist investors, short-term investors, and investors interested in ex-
tracting private benefits are more likely to have interests adverse to long-
term, sustainable economic growth.185  In this way, eliminating the vote for 
index fund investors could also have negative consequences for both long-
term shareholders and society as a whole. 
Third, as Professors Marcel Kahn and Edward Rock note, no share-
holder has pure incentives or zero conflicts of interest.186  To the extent that 
these conflicts vary, diversity of shareholders involved in the voting process 
can help to balance and thereby limit the effects of impure motives on actual 
outcomes.  Reducing this balance and increasing the power of the remaining 
shareholders would increase the vulnerability of corporations to these weak-
nesses of the remaining shareholders, perhaps strengthening conflicts of in-
terest or increasing the ability of shareholders with imperfect incentives to 
act on those incentives.187 
Fourth, such a move would distort the relationship between voting con-
trol and share ownership, increasing the voting power of non-indexed stocks 
without increasing their share ownership.  Such a change could have unfore-
seen consequences on the behavior of investors, corporations, and the market 
                                                          
 182.  See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2008) (contrasting the short-term focus of hedge funds with the interests 
of index funds and individual investors); Anabtawi, supra note 101, at 564 (describing the potential 
for hedge fund activists to promote short-term ends at the expense of long-term benefits); Brian J. 
Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. 
REV. 305, 330 (1998) (providing evidence that investors can influence the degree to which corpo-
rations invest in the long-term in harmful ways); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial 
Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 269 (2012) (discussing harms of short-
termist thinking); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007) (labeling hedge funds the “archetypal 
short-term investor”). 
 183.  See Strine, supra note 70, at 1923 (discussing how it is already true that “the most vocal 
and powerful of the electorate will be those with investment horizons the least aligned with human 
investors” and that hedge funds and actively managed funds are currently determining outcomes 
that do not match the interests of human investors). 
 184.  Id.at 1967 (describing index fund investors as “uniquely long-term and committed to sus-
tainable wealth creation.”). 
 185.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 21 (noting that were 
such a policy to be implement, some remaining shareholders “would have distinct personal interests 
in control” and that such a policy could “creat[e] the temptation to extract private benefits and in 
any event providing a windfall without apparent gains to shareholders or society as a whole”). 
 186.  Kahan & Rock, supra note 146, at 7. 
 187.  Id. at 55 (stating “conflicts of interests are endogenous to the legal system and a change in 
voting rules is likely to cause shareholders [to] gain more voting power to develop stronger con-
flicts”). 
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in general by significantly recalibrating the relationship between investors, 
proxy voting, and firm behavior.188  These unforeseen consequences may 
produce market shocks or other undesirable disruptions. 
E.  Dilution of Voting Power 
A more constrained version of the prior proposal might entail reducing 
the weight of votes wielded by index funds, perhaps to half or a quarter of a 
standard vote.  Though this approach would be more muted than eliminating 
index fund franchise altogether, it would have similar negative costs in terms 
of empowering other shareholders and reducing the voice of a substantial 
subset of investors.  Indeed, dilution would merely shift power between index 
fund managers and other players rather than addressing the disconnect be-
tween the preferences of individual investors and the ways in which index 
funds vote. 
Professor Dorothy Lund suggests such dilution might also be achieved 
by instituting pass-through voting, either uniformly or as a default rule.189  
This pass-through voting would mean that the votes on non-routine matters 
would be decided by the individual investors themselves, unless such inves-
tors opt out under a default regime.190  On its face, such a proposal appears 
to give the opportunity for individual investors to promote their own interests 
in voting decisions.  However, Professor Lund cites as a key advantage of 
such an approach the fact that individual investors would be unlikely to ac-
tually vote their shares, as they would be rationally apathetic to vote out-
comes due to the large burdens of voting their shares and the minimal benefits 
that would accrue to them given their relatively small levels of investment.191  
Because pass-through voting does not provide individual investors with a 
way to consolidate their voting decisions, it is unlikely to overcome rational 
apathy and would instead result in a similar outcome to eliminating voting 
for index funds entirely.192  As such, instead of increasing the power of indi-
vidual human investors to shape corporate decisionmaking, such an approach 
would actually diminish their power, since the benefits of expressing their 
preferences in such a granular fashion would likely be too small to warrant 
the effort. 
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F.  Ownership Caps 
Another proposal to mitigate problems associated with the rise of index 
funds is to implement firm-level or industry-level ownership caps that would 
specify investment levels that a given index fund could not exceed.193  Like 
voting limits, such ownership caps would dilute the power of a given index 
fund provider, preventing it from exerting too much power over a given com-
pany.  By reducing each index fund’s power, these limits might also reduce 
opportunities for self-dealing by index fund agents. 
However, this policy suggestion also has a number of key limitations.  
First, it would be difficult for regulators to determine the ownership threshold 
that accords index funds with sufficient but not excessive power.  Second, 
ownership in proportion to the broader index is the very strategy index funds 
use in their investment approach.  Forcing artificial limits on investment 
could have the perverse outcome of eliminating true indexing and replacing 
it with a distorted cousin, potentially compromising the financial wellbeing 
of index fund investors.194  Third, to the extent that index fund providers con-
tinue to share similar priorities and voting preferences,195 industry-level own-
ership caps would not significantly change the way in which shares are voted.  
If not paired with percentage-based caps, industry-level caps might actually 
result in each of the Big Three exerting greater control over the artificially 
limited number of companies in which they were allowed to invest.  Fourth, 
such a move would do little to address other problems, agency costs, the way 
in which shares are voted, and the disconnect between the preferences of an 
individual investor and a given index fund provider.  Fifth, if the policy dis-
torted the market for index fund services, such a move could raise fees at 
index funds and thereby harm the financial situation of index fund investors.  
Though these price increases might be small in scale, the philosophy of index 
fund investing is predicated in part on the harmful effect of high fees, an 
effect which is compounded over time.196  Given these costs, it is unclear 
whether such an approach would ultimately be beneficial. 
                                                          
 193.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 21–22; see also 
Bogle, supra note 20. 
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G.  Structural Limits 
Another policy suggestion is to limit the power in the hands of index 
fund agents by placing structural limits on index fund providers.197  One ap-
proach would involve limiting index fund providers’ power by constraining 
the activities such entities were permitted to do, such as requiring index fund 
providers to only market and manage index funds and not other investment 
vehicles like actively-managed mutual funds.198 
This approach would reduce the power wielded by index funds and 
thereby decrease the concentration of power in the hands of index fund pro-
viders, as many index fund providers vote the shares from actively and pas-
sively managed funds as a block.199  It would have the additional benefit of 
focusing index fund providers on serving the needs of index fund investors 
only, which might better align their incentives with those of their principals 
and would thereby reduce potential conflicts of interest. 
However, voting decisions would still reflect the priorities of the set of 
agents involved in the decisionmaking and not necessarily the actual prefer-
ences and interests of the investors themselves.  Second, these structural lim-
its might make it more difficult for index fund investors to shift their invest-
ments from index funds to actively managed funds, potentially diminishing 
competitive pressures on index funds by making the exit options more logis-
tically difficult.200 
Another approach would be to promote structural division of authority, 
perhaps dividing voting power for different issue areas to different team 
members, giving certain employees control over just a single channel of in-
fluence, or giving individuals voting control for just a subset of votes.201  This 
approach would reduce the overall power wielded by individual index fund 
employees, which would reduce opportunities or incentives for self-dealing 
behaviors.  Additionally, to the extent that this approach subdivided the votes 
for individual index funds or sets of index funds, this approach might also 
                                                          
 197.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 22. 
 198.  Id. at 22–23.  
 199.  Strine, supra note 70, at 1913–14 (“If you are a rational index fund investor and your fund 
will not exit until the portfolio stock leaves the index, you will find you get no independent thinking 
at all or any separate voice.  Rather, your index fund will vote the same way as the actively traded 
funds in the fund complex, regardless of the fact that the active funds do not hold long term, and 
regardless of key factors such as whether the issue on the table is a stock-for-stock merger in which 
the index fund holds both the acquirer and the target.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 200.  See Fisch et al., supra note 48, at 5 (arguing that “investors in index funds can exit at any 
time by selling their shares and . . . receiving the net asset value of their ownership interest.”); Kahan 
& Rock, supra note 146, at 13 (noting that “investors find it substantially easier to move funds 
within a mutual fund family than between mutual fund families”).  This exit option causes mutual 
funds–active and passive–to compete for investors both on price and performance. 
 201.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 22. 
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diversify the courses of action taken by index fund agents.  Indeed, such dif-
ferentiation in voting behavior can be seen at Fidelity, where individual fund 
managers make voting decisions rather than a centralized team.202  Fidelity 
funds exhibit internal disagreement in 3144 per 100,000 votes, 542 times 
more often than funds at Vanguard, 175 times more often than funds at 
BlackRock, and 16 times more often than funds at State Street.203 
However, there are some limitations to this approach as well. Like the 
former version of structural limits, this approach also does not promote 
awareness of, or attention to, the actual interests and perspectives of index 
fund investors.  Second, to the extent that this approach increases costs by 
complicating investment stewardship, index fund investors would have to 
pay higher fees for investment services.  Third, the division of power might 
blunt the ability of index fund providers to wield their power effectively, po-
tentially to the disservice of index fund investors.  Finally, to the extent that 
the employees of Vanguard, BlackRock, State Street, and other such funds 
are committed to similar principles of corporate governance (and to hiring 
individuals with similar values), such a policy may not lead to as high a level 
of differentiation as has been seen at Fidelity. 
H.  Antitrust 
An additional way to limit the power of index funds is via antitrust re-
sponses.  One such proposal would limit the ability of index funds to control 
multiple companies in a given industry, particularly in industries that are of 
“competitive concern” due to market concentration.204  Such an approach, 
particularly if limited to areas of true concern and if well-applied, could have 
the benefit of redressing anticompetitive effects some believe are associated 
with the rise of indexing.205 
However, there would be negative implications to this proposal as well.  
Like ownership caps, industry caps would limit the ability of index funds to 
accurately mimic indices of the broader market in a way that could harm in-
dex fund investors and their portfolios.  Second, index funds might be forced 
to select one competitor in a given industry despite its proportional size in 
the actual index.  Such competitors would be induced to compete for index 
fund providers’ investment in their particular firm.  As a result, this approach 
might inadvertently strengthen the power and influence of index funds over 
firms’ behaviors in concentrated industries.  Third, it is not clear if there is 
                                                          
 202.  Fichtner et al., supra note 3, at 316–17. 
 203.  Id. at 317. 
 204.  Posner et al., supra note 41, at 696–98. 
 205.  See supra notes 155–159 and accompanying text. 
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enough heterogeneity among fund providers’ incentives and corporate gov-
ernance philosophies in order to produce real change in this area.  Under the 
status quo, the Big Three tend to share similar priorities and have similar 
corporate governance philosophies, suggesting that the anticipated benefits 
from limiting ownership of any one index fund provider to one competitor in 
a given industry might be limited.  The goal of this approach could be under-
mined if the multiple index fund providers each controlling a competitor 
merely imposed the same corporate governance practices in vogue before.  
Fourth, it might be exceedingly difficult for regulators or commentators to 
meaningfully define an “industry” and to define the threshold levels of con-
centration in a given market—the impact of such a change would vary sub-
stantially based on the breadth of this definition.206  As such, this proposal 
might be difficult to implement well.  Altogether, this proposal might have 
the benefit of addressing concerns about anticompetitive effects due to the 
increasing power of index funds; however, the side effects, including logisti-
cal difficulties, uncertain benefits, and negative impacts on index funds in-
vestors themselves, might render this approach undesirable. 
I.  Policing Conflicts of Interest 
An additional proposal involves efforts to limit conflicts of interest.  For 
example, compliance officers could regularly report on potential or actual 
conflicts of interest and the measures taken to address these conflicts.207  Ef-
forts to curb conflicts of interest would have the potential to increase the in-
dependence of index fund corporate governance teams.  To the extent that 
compliance with these requirements increases burdens on index fund provid-
ers, such efforts would be likely to slightly raise the fees for index funds to 
defray the accompanying costs. 
Though these efforts might be a useful way to reduce conflicts of inter-
est, some efforts to manage conflicts of interest are already underway at the 
Big Three index fund providers, calling into question whether additional ef-
forts would significantly change the status quo.  For example, Vanguard in-
tentionally separates power between individuals charged with voting deci-
sions and those whose duties include external client relationship management 
or sales.208  In addition, Vanguard provides training on conflicts of interest, 
requires employees to recuse themselves when conflicts of interest do exist, 
has a Conflicts of Interest Policy, and maintains a Conflicts Register.209  
                                                          
 206.  Bogle, supra note 20 (referring to the “the dubious ability of either academia or federal 
bureaucrats to define precisely what constitutes a given industry”). 
 207.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 22–23. 
 208.  VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, STEWARDSHIP POLICY (2016), https://global.van-
guard.com/documents/stewardship-policy.pdf. 
 209.  Id. 
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BlackRock, for its part, also has policies and procedures set in place to coun-
ter potential conflicts of interest, including relying upon an independent fi-
duciary to vote on behalf of clients when necessary.210  Likewise, State Street 
takes considerable efforts to reduce potential conflicts of interest.  These ef-
forts include vesting sole voting discretion to members of the Asset Steward-
ship team, requiring mandatory disclosure of potential conflicts of interest, 
utilizing a Proxy Review Committee to oversee the stewardship team and to 
manage potential and actual conflicts of interest, and outsourcing voting de-
cisions when necessary.211  Given these considerable efforts at the largest 
index fund providers, it may be redundant to pursue additional efforts to mit-
igate potential conflicts of interest.  At the most, these efforts would represent 
only a moderate change to the status quo, and they would be unlikely to ad-
dress concerns about concentration of power, lack of homogeneity in recom-
mendations, and lack of attention to individual investors’ actual preferences. 
J.  Regulation of Engagements 
An additional proposal would take steps to regulate or eliminate engage-
ments between index fund providers and portfolio companies.212  Regulating 
engagements could involve placing limits on which index fund employees 
could participate in engagements, on the content or nature of these discus-
sions, or on how these interactions are reported to the public, while eliminat-
ing engagements would involve an outright ban on these activities with ac-
companying monitoring to ensure compliance.213 
Efforts to constrain and control engagements might reduce the potential 
for abuse of power by index fund employees, since these channels of com-
munication are not currently directly monitored.  Additionally, to the extent 
that these measures involve disclosure, they would give investors more in-
formation about how index fund providers are acting on their behalf, which 
could give them more power to encourage best practices and limit miscon-
duct. 
However, index fund providers do already provide some information on 
engagements to their clients and the public at large, including overall statis-
tics and case study examples.214  Additionally, it is possible that these efforts 
                                                          
 210.  BLACKROCK , BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP (2020), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-profile-of-blackrock-investment-
stewardship-team-work.pdf. 
 211.  STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, 2019 SSGA CONFLICT MITIGATION GUIDELINES 
(2019), https://www.ssga.com/library-content/pdfs/ic/2019-ssga-conflict-mitigation-guide-
lines.pdf. 
 212.  See Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 22–23. 
 213.  Id.  
 214.  See, e.g., VANGUARD INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 53, at 11–30 (providing twenty 
pages of information and case study data on engagement activities); BLACKROCK, supra note 53, 
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to minimize engagements could simply result in a shift from engagements to 
less direct forms of communication, such as publishing more detailed voting 
guidelines or engaging with popular media to express concerns about a par-
ticular company or practice.  In this way, these efforts may not produce a 
significantly different outcome than the status quo. 
K.  Insufficiency of Current Proposals 
These solutions individually and in combination have the potential to 
remedy some concrete problems associated with the rise in index fund own-
ership, including concentration of power, anticompetitive effects, potential 
for abuse of power by index fund agents, conflicts of interest, and insufficient 
transparency.  However, none of the above proposals successfully mitigates 
one key problem: the disconnect between how index funds vote their shares 
and the actual preferences and interests of their individual investors.  Some 
proposals, including those involving dilution or elimination of voting for in-
dex funds, would only deepen the disconnect between the interests of index 
fund investors and corporate decisionmaking.  To the extent that we view 
shareholder franchise as a valuable exercise, insulating or totally excluding 
actual investors from the decision-making process subverts the fundamental 
goals of shareholder democracy.215  The following Part sets out a proposal 
that would both mitigate some concerns about the rising power of index funds 
and would give individual investors themselves the opportunity to influence 
how that power is wielded. 
VII.  AN ALTERNATE APPROACH 
“Human investors,” the individuals investing in the stock market for re-
tirement or other long-term goals, have long been characterized as “rationally 
apathetic” about corporate governance decisions.216  Even though their in-
vestments may represent a large portion of their life savings, their holdings 
in a given company tend to be so small that their vote has minimal impact on 
                                                          
at 7–21; STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra note 53, at 48–99 (providing data, statistics, and 
case study information on engagement efforts). 
 215.  See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The share-
holder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power 
rests.”). 
 216.  See supra Section III.A; see also Bainbridge, supra note 101, at 558 (“[M]ost shareholders 
are rationally apathetic.  A rational shareholder will expend the effort necessary to make informed 
decisions only if the expected benefits of doing so outweigh its costs.  Given the length and com-
plexity of corporate disclosure documents, the opportunity cost entailed in making informed deci-
sions is both high and apparent.  In contrast, the expected benefits of becoming informed are quite 
low, as most shareholders’ holdings are too small to have significant effect on the outcome of share-
holder votes.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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the outcome of a shareholder vote.217  As a consequence, the value of con-
ducting research on ballot items or engaging with boards of directors is far 
offset by the costs of such activities, meaning that the typical human investor 
is better off choosing not to exercise his or her voting rights.218  This rational 
apathy manifests itself in actual voting behavior: Only 28% of shares held by 
individual investors were voted at annual meetings in 2019.219 
Index funds, however, represent an opportunity for this rational apathy 
to be transformed into rational involvement.  This is because index funds 
already employ a team of corporate governance experts and proxy advisory 
firms to engage in research and to perform the actual voting in the many 
shareholder meetings on behalf of the ordinary humans that invest in index 
funds.  These funds are in turn supported by considerable infrastructure and 
proxy advisory services that permit index fund providers to automate voting 
decisions according to a set of voting guidelines.  Though it is irrational for 
these individual index fund investors to replicate such efforts, it is not irra-
tional for these investors to express their general preferences to existing cor-
porate governance teams, particularly if doing so can be done efficiently. 
Priority setting can take various forms, which will be discussed below.  
However, the common element to all of these approaches is an infrequent 
expression of generalized priorities or preferences, which would be used to 
guide index fund representatives in casting votes on behalf of the index fund. 
A.  Options for Involving Index Fund Investors 
This Section provides recommended solutions for increased involve-
ment of individual investors in stewardship decisions.  Under these reforms, 
index fund providers would (1) give individual investors the option to have 
the proxy votes corresponding to their ownership shares voted according to 
the recommendations of a investor-chosen representative (“indirect democ-
racy”); (2) solicit input from individual investors on their preferences, inter-
ests, and values via a survey or poll (“informed discretion”); (3) permit voting 
rights to pass-through to individual investors who would be able to craft 
standing voting instructions on common ballot items (“pass-through voting 
instructions”); or, ideally, (4) use all three of above methods in combination, 
based upon investors’ intensity of preference and the nature of the ballot item. 
                                                          
 217.  Id.; see also Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the “Absent” Shareholders: A New 
Solution to Retail Investors’ Apathy, 41 Del. J. Corp. L. 55, 60–61 (2016). 
 218.  Kastiel & Nili, supra note 217, at 60–61. 
 219.  PROXYPULSE, supra note 46. 
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1.  Indirect Democracy 
One approach to involving human investors in the voting process would 
be to permit investors to select a representative that they desire to determine 
voting decisions.220  For example, human investors could express a prefer-
ence to have the votes corresponding to their ownership cast according to the 
index fund provider’s recommendations, according to a given proxy advisory 
company’s recommendations, according to the board’s recommendations, in 
accordance with another institutional investor, proportionally in line with 
other investors in the fund, or to abstain from voting altogether.221  Alterna-
tively, they might have the option to choose between a menu of different 
proxy advisory services—indeed, additional demand for more tailored proxy 
advisory services could spur new entry into this space, providing much-
needed competition in a sector dominated by only two firms.222  The selection 
of a representative would be expressed at an infrequent interval, perhaps an-
nually or biennially. 
When making this decision, investors could be offered information and 
resources about how these various groups tend to vote, the voting guidelines 
                                                          
 220.  This model was pioneered by private third-party service providers such as Moxy Vote.  
However, Moxy Vote and others are now defunct, in part due to the cost and complexity of com-
plying with burdensome proxy solicitation requirements.  See Ross Kerber, Shareholder Website 
Closing, Cites Complex Voting Rules, REUTERS (July 10, 2012, 6:33 PM), https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/moxyvote-shutdown/shareholder-website-closing-cites-complex-voting-rules-
idUSL2E8IA8XU20120710.  This Article posits that, because funds are legally voting their own 
proxies rather than those of “ultimate investors,” a similar approach in the context of index 
fund/ETF voting would have reduced complexity and a greater likelihood of success. 
 221.  Steve Norman, former Corporate Secretary of American Express, proposed a similar ap-
proach to harnessing retail investors’ votes as a part of the New York Stock Exchange’s 2005 Proxy 
Working Group.  He suggested that retail shareholders be given four options, including that their 
votes (1) be cast in favor the board’s recommendation, (2) be case against the board’s recommen-
dation, (3) not be voted, or (4) be voted proportionally with the votes of other retail investors.  See 
Fisch, supra note 149, at 30.  Similarly, Professors Kobi Kastiel and Yaron Nili proposed permitting 
retail investors to select from a menu of options for casting their votes, including (1) the option to 
vote with management, (2) the option to vote according to the recommendations of proxy advisors, 
(3) the option to vote with the majority of shareholders (which might be calculated with or without 
managements’ shares), and (4) the option to abstain from voting.  Kastiel & Nili, supra note 217, at 
88.  Because institutional investors already have systems in place to centralize voting decisions and 
because there are fewer legal hurdles to involving individual investors in the voting process at the 
index fund level, it may be substantially easier to implement these types of policies in the context 
of index fund investors.  See infra Section VII.C.  Additionally, given the decline of retail investing 
and corresponding growth of index funds, providing these options at the index fund level may be a 
more effective way to involve human investors in the voting process.  See Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. 
Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute 
for Law and Economics: The Future of Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007) (transcript available 
at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm) (“[O]ver the last half century direct stock 
ownership by U.S. retail investors has been in an on-going decline relative to ownership by institu-
tions.  Institutional ownership used to be almost irrelevant.  Now, retail ownership seems to be 
headed in that direction.”). 
 222.  Tingle, supra note 94, at 743. 
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crafted by these groups, and/or data on the impact that these groups have had 
on corporate decisionmaking or share price.  Individual investors could also 
decide to seek advice on their decision from corporate governance experts or 
financial advisors, whether paid or unpaid.  Since the decision would be in-
frequent and impactful, seeking paid guidance on the choice of representation 
for this “indirect democracy” option would be far more financially feasible 
than doing so for individual companies or individual ballot items.  Addition-
ally, individual investors might also opt to pursue independent research on 
these entities, perhaps availing themselves of resources provided by the enti-
ties themselves, the index fund provider, corporate law scholars, economists, 
or others with relevant expertise. 
To be sure, such a policy would not offer human investors infinite 
choices and may force them into small boxes that imperfectly represent their 
actual needs and interests.  However, even this level of involvement in deci-
sionmaking would harness their perspectives on corporate governance to a 
greater degree than the status quo.  Moreover, were such a policy to be im-
plemented, it seems likely that the various entities involved would seek to 
distinguish themselves on matters of corporate governance and call attention 
to their differences, thereby further increasing the true choices available to 
human investors.  Such an approach might also encourage competition be-
tween index fund providers, proxy advisors, and related entities, providing 
the opportunity for superior approaches to corporate governance to be iden-
tified and rewarded. 
2.  Informed Discretion 
A second way that individual human investors could be involved in 
shaping the voting decisions made by index funds is through expressing their 
individual circumstances and values in an annual or even quinquennial sur-
vey.223  In these surveys, individual human investors would be asked to pro-
vide relevant information about their financial circumstances and investment 
priorities, such as their time horizon for investment, their wealth class, their 
risk tolerance level, their spending habits, and their age.  Investors could also 
be given the opportunity to express their values regarding political, environ-
mental, social, and labor issues.  This data would then be shared with corpo-
rate governance teams at a given index fund provider (or their chosen proxy 
advisory firms), who would be tasked with utilizing this information in shap-
ing voting decisions.224  Because of the vast scale of index funds and the 
                                                          
 223.  In this vein, some have proposed that funds would poll a representative sample of their 
investors to gauge investors preference on key issues, such as social responsibility resolutions.  See 
Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 238 (2018). 
 224.  If these changes are not taken up at the fund level, other market actors may generate their 
own “feedback mechanisms” to facilitate the expression of their values.  See Letter from John C. 
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concentration of voting power in centralized corporate governance teams, 
this information could be aggregated and grouped, simplifying the burden on 
index fund management while still ensuring that due consideration is given 
to the unique situations of actual human investors. 
There are a number of voting decisions that might be better made by 
agents with some sense of the unique situation of their individual investors.  
For example, investors with a long time horizon for investment may be more 
likely to favor significant investment in research and development.225  Some 
investors might be passionately committed to promoting environmental sus-
tainability, human rights, fair labor practices, religious values, or other social 
goals (either alone or in combination) and desire for index fund providers to 
advocate for these outcomes on their behalf.226  Investors of modest means 
who spend a significant portion of their income on household goods might 
be wary of mergers that might induce price increases, while wealthier inves-
tors with substantial portfolios would be more likely to benefit from such 
mergers even in the face of price increases.227  When considering questions 
such as these, data on investor composition and values would aid index funds 
in promoting the actual interests and desires of their shareholders. 
A potential shortcoming of this approach is that it necessitates giving 
considerable discretion to index fund representatives in interpreting how the 
characteristics and priorities of individual investors should translate into ac-
tual votes.  Nonetheless, this approach offers many advantages in comparison 
to the status quo. First, as numerous scholars have argued,228 shareholders 
have diverse characteristics and priorities that ought to be reflected in how 
companies are managed, and attention to these diverse characteristics is a 
vital first step in ensuring that they are translated into how corporations are 
managed.  Second, by virtue of increasing accountability of index funds to 
                                                          
Wilcox, Chairman, Morrow Sodali Global LLC, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-725/4725-4840503-177168.pdf (stat-
ing that concerns such as “(i) concentration and common ownership of stocks by index funds; and 
(ii) the exercise of voting power by ETFs without reference to the views of ultimate owners in 
managed accounts . . . combined with the growing popularity of collective investment vehicles will 
sooner or later give rise to private sector mechanisms for informal pass-through referendums on 
ETF’s and indexers’ voting policies.”). 
 225.  See Eric M. Fogel & Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-
Oxley and the Independent Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 61 (2007) (“Longer-term 
investors are interested in the redeployment of capital for research and development to generate 
profits tomorrow.”). 
 226.  See, e.g., HUNG-GAY FUNG ET AL., SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN A GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENT 5 (2010) (describing shareholder engagers and activists who endeavor to utilize their 
influence to promote social ends). 
 227.  See Griffin, supra note 157. 
 228.  See, e.g., Orts, supra note 101, at 1591 (arguing for recognition and consideration of share-
holders’ diverse and potentially conflicting interests); Stout, supra note 101, at 174 (noting that 
shareholders have diverse interests).  
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the actual perspectives of their shareholders, such a policy reduces the power 
of index fund managers.  Third, this approach would likely entail greater de-
viation in how index funds vote the shares under their control, reducing the 
overall power of index funds to determine voting outcomes and better align-
ing the votes with the actual traits and preferences of investors.  Fourth, this 
approach has the potential to diversify the approaches taken by index funds 
and to allow them to compete on how they exercise their control, giving more 
options to investors and creating competitive pressure towards optimal cor-
porate governance. 
3.  Pass-Through Voting Instructions 
A third way in which index funds could involve human investors in the 
decision-making process is to enable them to express a preference for how to 
tackle the key issues in corporate governance in the form of pass-through 
voting instructions.229  These voting instructions could be selected once when 
an account with the fund provider was opened, with an annual option to up-
date preferences or to leave them as before.  Investors could also be given the 
option to defer to other agents, such as an index fund provider, proxy advisor, 
portfolio company management, or another institutional investor, on most 
questions, but to select a few individual questions about which they desire to 
express their preferences more directly.  These preferences could vary in 
specificity, but the basic goal would be to give investors greater voice regard-
ing the way index funds vote their shares.  For example, a relatively simple 
survey might ask whether the individual investor would prefer to have the 
funds’ votes cast in support or in opposition to a merger where the fund only 
                                                          
 229.  Other scholars have proposed a similar approach in the context of retail investors.  See, 
e.g., Fisch, supra note 149, at 45 (proposing the implementation of standardized voting instructions 
that would “allow [retail] investors to designate issue-specific voting policies or guidelines, such as 
voting against classified boards, in favor of separating the chair and CEO, or against overboarded 
directors. . . . An even more complex menu might enable investors to set up screens which would 
operate to direct the investors’ vote in accordance with specified criteria—such as voting in accord-
ance with management recommendations unless the screen flags a problem like underperformance 
or poor corporate governance”); Kastiel & Nili, supra note 217, at 90 (proposing that retail share-
holders could have the option to select “a different short-cut for each type of questions that are 
brought for a shareholder vote”).  There are several factors which suggest that this proposal might 
be more effectively implemented in the index fund context, including existing infrastructure at index 
fund provider companies to support such a policy and fewer legal hurdles to soliciting this infor-
mation from investors since index fund investors do not legally have proxies to solicit.  See infra 
Section VII.C.  Additionally, as more and more human investors transition to index fund investing, 
the index fund context may be a more efficient route for involving large numbers of individual 
investors in the voting process.  See Cartwright supra note 221.  There has recently been growing 
interest in providing “pass-through voting” functionality for mutual fund and ETF investors.  See 
generally, Letter from John C. Wilcox to Brent J. Fields, supra note 224 (“A case can be made that 
investors who delegate stock picking and proxy voting decisions to third-party professionals, while 
having no standing to vote at shareholder meetings, should have some means to voluntarily inform 
their fiduciaries about their views on issues affecting their investments.”). 
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owned shares of the acquirer, unless the fund provider had a compelling rea-
son to vote otherwise.230  A more detailed survey might ask the following 
question: 
In a merger where you own shares only of the acquirer, you would 
desire the funds’ shares: 
 (a) to always be voted to approve the merger, 
 (b) to always be voted to oppose the merger, 
 (c) to be voted to oppose the merger unless there was compelling  
 evidence of unique circumstances making increased returns more  
 likely than average, 
 (d) to be voted according to management’s recommendations, 
 (e) to be voted according to [a given proxy advisor]’s recommen- 
 dations, 
 (f) to be voted according to the stewardship team’s recommen- 
 dations, 
 (g) to be voted in proportion to the survey results from all other  
 index fund shareholders, or 
 (h) not be voted. 
In either survey form, shareholders could be provided with basic infor-
mation or articles that summarize the debates over these issues, including the 
positions of both sides and various pros and cons.  These summaries might 
be written by independent advisors, proxy advisors, academics, or other ex-
perts.  These brief articles could also include links to longer papers and stud-
ies for investors interested in more information.  Additionally, individual in-
vestors would also have the option of doing their own research into these 
topics and discussing these matters with financial advisors or other experts 
before making any decisions. 
Overall, this process would allow individual investors to express their 
actual views on key corporate governance issues, giving them greater voice 
on matters that are likely relevant to their financial interests and to their per-
sonal values and beliefs.  Deferring to investors on these issues would have 
the benefit of diversifying the pool of decisionmakers charged with tackling 
these important questions.  It would also significantly blunt the power of in-
dex fund agents, since they would be constrained by the preferences of their 
investors.  To the extent that voters express conflicting preferences, such a 
policy might also reduce the power of index fund providers as a whole, since 
they might have to divide their influence in support of opposite ends. 
                                                          
 230.  If past investors had chosen to vote “no” on all mergers in which they held shares only in 
the acquirer, there is evidence to suggest that they would have obtained superior returns.  See, e.g., 
Anup Agrawal et al., The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Reexamination of an 
Anomaly, 47 J. FIN. 1605, 1605 (1992) (finding “acquiring firms suffer a statistically significant loss 
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could change investor voting preferences. 
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On the negative side, however, this option is the most likely to impact 
the prices of index fund services, since it might be more burdensome to im-
plement the views expressed by individual investors.  However, given the 
existing infrastructure to support automated voting according to voting 
guidelines and the economies of scale enjoyed by index fund providers and 
other institutional investors, such price effects are likely to be insignificant at 
a per-investor level.231  Additionally, such a policy could reduce the efforts 
index fund providers must expend to research and set priorities on their own, 
since investors would be involved in the priority setting (and thereby would 
provide the fund with valuable data as to overall investor preferences).  This 
might help offset any accompanying costs.  Finally, some investors may be 
happy to pay slightly higher fees (perhaps a few basis points) to have a say 
in voting at the companies in which they are ultimately invested.  As com-
peting with the Big Three based on fees is difficult due to their scale, compe-
tition on something other than fees (i.e., pass-through voting functionality) 
could spur welcome new entrants into the index fund space. 
4.  A Hybrid Approach 
Given the heterogeneity of index fund investors, the ideal approach to 
soliciting investor input would combine all three approaches described 
above.  Under such a hybrid approach, all mutual fund investors would have 
the right to issue pass-through voting instructions on ten to twenty of the most 
salient issues, and those with the highest intensity of preference would do so.  
Those with lower intensity of preference could either utilize the “indirect de-
mocracy” method of selecting an actor whose votes they would mirror, or 
they could choose to have the fund vote on their behalf.  If they chose the 
latter, rather than guessing at their investors’ views on shareholder resolu-
tions, funds would poll their investors to inform their voting decisions.  Com-
bining all three approaches in this tiered manner would ensure that all index 
fund investors would have an opportunity to express their preferences in a 
manner suited to their situation. 
B.  Potential Benefits of Deference to Index Fund Investors 
Increased deference to investors entails a number of benefits for inves-
tors and society at large.  These include (1) reduced concentration of power, 
(2) increased heterogeneity in decisionmaking, (3) increased alignment be-
tween funds’ voting behaviors and index fund investors’ interests, (4) de-
creased rational apathy, and (5) improved incentives for good corporate gov-
ernance.  This Section explores these benefits in greater detail. 
                                                          
 231.  See infra Section VII.C. 
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1.  Reduced Concentration of Power 
At a general level, a policy involving some degree of deference to the 
actual preferences of human investors would entail numerous benefits.  First, 
by giving index fund investors some influence over voting decisions, such a 
policy would spread decision-making power to a larger group of individuals.  
This would reduce the concentration of power in the hands of index fund 
providers, in-house corporate governance divisions, individual index fund 
provider employees, and proxy advisors.  This would take proposals to spread 
index funds’ power across more index fund employees several steps further, 
spreading that power to potentially millions of index fund investors rather 
than a few dozen index fund employees. 
2.  Increased Heterogeneity in Decisionmaking 
Deference to individual investors would diversify the pool of deci-
sionmakers, including the voices of segments of society who currently have 
little voice in corporate decisionmaking.  Additionally, to the extent that these 
individual investors have diverse interests, such a policy also has the potential 
to increase the heterogeneity of voting priorities and voting guidelines at the 
fund level, index fund provider level, or both.  This could result in increased 
differentiation between funds, proxy advisors, and index fund providers on 
matters of corporate governance, potentially providing the opportunity for 
optimal corporate governance practices to competitively emerge.  While cur-
rently index funds are “essentially commodities,”232 such differentiation 
would reduce the interchangeability of index funds and spur competition on 
factors other than fees.233  Like competition in any market, competition in the 
market for voting control would have the benefit of increasing incentives for 
good corporate governance and would create greater opportunities for good 
corporate governance practices to be attempted, identified, recognized, and 
rewarded. 
3.  Increased Alignment with Index Fund Investors’ Interests 
Third, such a policy would better align the preferences and priorities of 
actual human investors with the voting behaviors of index fund providers.  
Such an outcome would give voice to the interests of the actual owners of 
index funds, i.e., the principals in this agency relationship, whose interests 
should be paramount.  Fund managers have a fiduciary duty to ensure that 
                                                          
 232.  Kahan & Rock, supra note 146, at 12, 51. 
 233.  Id. at 51 (stating that ESG issues “could also be justified as effective marketing . . . a form 
of non-price competition designed to attract investments into what has become a commodity”). 
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the funds’ shares are voted in their investors’ best interests,234 and allowing 
investors to express their own interests is almost certainly more accurate than 
allowing a small, centralized corporate governance committee to attempt to 
discern those interests independently.235  Additionally, because index fund 
investors are uniquely interested in long-term, sustainable economic growth 
and stability, advancement of their interests has the potential to benefit soci-
ety as whole.236 
4.  Decreased Rational Apathy 
Fourth, such a policy would help overcome the rational apathy of indi-
vidual investors, since an infrequent expression of voting preferences would 
be a far briefer and less onerous activity than deciding how to vote on indi-
vidual ballot items.237  This would reduce the potential for index funds to be 
passive players in the corporate governance arena.  Additionally, by counter-
ing rational apathy, this policy would efficiently harness index fund inves-
tors’ incentives.  After all, rational apathy does not mean that these investors 
have no interest in good corporate governance but rather that expressing their 
preferences is too burdensome.  By reducing obstacles to involvement and 
allowing investors to provide broad answers to types of questions rather than 
the thousands of granular questions themselves, this policy would harness 
index fund investors’ incentives to promote good corporate governance and 
put them to more efficient use. 
Further, as a normative matter, including the heterogenous views of 
such investors legitimizes shareholder democracy.  Even if a significant por-
tion of investors fail to exercise this power, at least they will do so by choice.  
Simply because many, or even most, investors would be rationally apathetic 
should not be cause for denying direct participating in the franchise for all 
others.238 
                                                          
 234.  Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6580 (Jan. 31, 2003) (referring to 
the “fiduciary duties to vote proxies of portfolio securities in the best interest of fund shareholders”). 
 235.  See generally, F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 
524 (1945). 
 236.  Strine, supra note 70, at 1967. 
 237.  Some contend that pass-through voting would increase rational apathy, on the ground that 
such voting would require investors to annually consider “thousands of matters.”  See Sean J. Grif-
fith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 98 Tex. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020).  However, such a criticism is based upon an overly restricted descrip-
tion of pass-through voting, since index fund investors could instead be asked to express preferences 
through generalized pass-through voting instructions (e.g., “Vote against all overboarded directors,” 
or “Vote for all climate-related disclosures”), a task that would be far less onerous.  
 238.  See Fisch, supra note 149, at 16 (stating as a normative matter that “voting results should 
convey the views of all shareholders”).  Although mutual fund investors are owners of shares in the 
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5.  Improved Incentives for Good Corporate Governance 
Fifth, deference to human investors has the potential to better align the 
incentives of those wielding power over corporate governance standards with 
the outcomes they promote.  Prompting index fund investors to go through 
the process of answering these questions might make them realize that they 
have been voting for things they do not support and are entirely antithetical 
to their interests.  The act of selecting their preferences may provide valuable 
information to principals about the way that their fiduciary is voting, perhaps 
making an environmentalist investor realize that their shares have been used 
to oppose green initiatives at companies for years.  In this way, involving 
individual investors in the voting process might make them more aware of 
the actions of their agents, more interested in monitoring the behaviors of 
those agents, and more vocal in promoting their own interests, which would 
provide a beneficial check on index funds’ power.  Moreover, if investors are 
involved in deciding what constitutes their best interests in some way, then 
index fund investors will have a metric that they can use to assess whether or 
not index fund providers are adequately pursuing that interest.  By giving 
investors some check on index fund providers’ power, this approach could 
decrease agency costs, encourage transparency, and improve the incentives 
of index fund investors. 
*** 
In the ways discussed in the subsections above, it may be possible to use 
deference to index fund investors to address some of the key concerns about 
the rising power of index funds without resorting to disenfranchising index 
funds and their investors and without relying on regulations which might 
raise prices for index fund services or promote outcomes not necessarily con-
sistent with index fund investors’ will.239  By involving the index fund inves-
tors themselves in the decision-making process, it could be possible to sim-
ultaneously increase alignment of outcomes with index fund investors’ actual 
interests, increase competition and diversity in index fund corporate govern-
ance, and provide a check on the growing power of index funds and their 
managers. 
C.  Potential Concerns About Deference to Index Fund Investors 
Although there are benefits to deferring to index fund investors, a 
change to the status quo is only merited if such benefits outweigh associated 
costs.  This section explores potential costs in greater detail, including: (1) 
                                                          
mutual fund and not the company itself, the fund itself is a fiduciary agent for its investors that is 
bound to vote in the investors’, rather than its own, interests.  
 239.  See Kastiel & Nili, supra note 217, at 96. 
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the potential that individual investors are “uninformed”, (2) the need for in-
frastructure to support investor involvement in stewardship activities, (3) the 
risk that investor involvement might lead to increased fees for indexed in-
vesting, (4) any legal hurdles that might prohibit or restrict investors involve-
ment, (5) the costs associated with both proportional voting and block voting 
of investors’ shares and the need to select between the two options, and (6) 
implementation challenges. 
1.  Reliance upon “Uninformed” Judgments 
However, there are some potential limitations to deferring to index fund 
investors.  First, such an approach might inspire fears that involving unso-
phisticated or uninformed investors in decisionmaking would lead to worse 
outcomes.240  To some extent, these fears might be the byproduct of paternal-
istic thinking on the part of academics, commentators, or index fund repre-
sentatives, and, therefore, these fears might be difficult to overcome. 
However, a number of features specific to this proposal might mitigate 
such concerns.  Deference to individual investors could involve providing 
these investors with the option to defer to the recommendations of more so-
phisticated players, such as index fund representatives, proxy advisors, or 
firm management, and individual investors could always be given the option 
to opt out of expressing their preferences (or instead be required to initially 
opt in).  Additionally, deference to individual investors would be designed in 
such a way that these investors have greater incentive to become informed, 
since their involvement would be less burdensome and more efficient, mak-
ing them far more informed on the questions asked of them than they might 
be about the particulars of a single ballot item or a single company.  Further, 
pass-through voting instructions provide a useful method to gauge the inten-
sity of investors’ preferences.  The investment of the time required to partic-
ipate filters out those apathetic or uninterested investors (who would prefer 
to abstain or defer) and gives greater power to interested, better-informed 
investors. 
Moreover, while some would criticize the average investor as “unso-
phisticated” or “uniformed,” there is little to support the notion that the opin-
ions of proxy advisors or corporate governance teams on contentious social 
and environmental issues, many of which are political in nature, should be 
preferred over those of their investors.  In fact, there is reason to believe that 
                                                          
 240.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate 
Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2119 (2019) (stating that 
pass-through voting “would likely be based on very little information”); Lund, supra note 81, at 531 
(implying that individual index fund investors might engage in uniformed thinking). 
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proxy advisors and corporate governance teams do not have any superior ex-
pertise in these issues at all.241  Likewise, there is no obvious consensus on 
which corporate governance practices, if any, uniformly produce superior re-
turns.  Because of the lack of any special expertise and the lack of a clear 
“right answer” to many of the questions at issue in proxy votes, it is difficult 
or impossible to say that individual investors would be wrong in their ex-
pressed preferences.  They may, in fact, pursue economically superior out-
comes to existing corporate governance teams, and, at any rate, they would 
be more likely to produce the voting outcomes they prefer.  The idea that 
investors cannot become adequately informed on, say, fifteen broad ques-
tions seems to both overly denigrate the intelligence of ordinary investors and 
to overly reify the capabilities of index fund stewardship teams to make de-
cisions on social and environmental issues beyond their core expertise. 
Additionally, a number of characteristics about individual index fund 
investors suggest that the risk of these individuals making unthinking or un-
informed judgments might be low.  First, index fund investors often place a 
significant portion of their life savings in their investments, funds which they 
use for major life expenses such as saving for retirement, funding their chil-
dren’s education, or setting aside an emergency fund.242  Though their invest-
ment might seem “small” compared to the size of Vanguard’s holdings or the 
net worth of a director, it is likely to be a “large” investment in terms of its 
importance to individual investors and their financial future.  Because of the 
personal importance of these funds, it is likely that individual investors will 
either make informed choices, defer to another player, or abstain from ex-
pressing an opinion.243  Second, these individuals are likely to be considera-
bly more diverse than the corporate managers and index fund agents who 
represent them.  Because they are more representative of America as a whole, 
index fund investors are likely to be far more impacted by economic and so-
cial externalities of corporate behaviors, meaning these individuals are likely 
to be more invested in mitigating externalities and promoting sustainable eco-
nomic growth.244  In this way, they are potentially more likely to be affected 
                                                          
 241.  Griffith, supra note 237, at 1 (“With respect to environmental and social issues, meaningful 
information is not produced nor can mutual funds assume a common investor purpose.”). 
 242.  Strine, supra note 70, at 1874. 
 243.  See Fisch, supra note 149, at 44–46. 
 244.  See Strine, supra note 70, at 1879 (describing how “most workers have a substantial inter-
est in the durable appreciation of their portfolio, and do not benefit in any way from stock bubbles 
arising from gimmicks or unsustainable strategies because these gains will go away and if those 
bubbles result in economic recessions and diminutions in economic growth, the worker will suffer 
both at the time of retirement, and perhaps more importantly, during their working careers, as eco-
nomic slowdowns that result in job losses and wage stagnation threaten their most important source 
of wealth”). 
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by and informed about negative externalities than other players in corporate 
decisionmaking. 
2.  Infrastructure 
An additional concern is how to develop the infrastructure to support 
increased deference to investors, whether in the form of indirect democracy, 
informed discretion, pass-through voting instructions, or some combination 
of the three.  Fortunately, however, there already exists substantial infrastruc-
ture at index fund providers to support voting.245  Existing corporate govern-
ance teams could be redeployed in an effort to better represent the actual 
preferences of index fund investors, and existing relationships with proxy 
advisory companies could be altered to provide extra support on research or 
voting implementation.  Additionally, there are already digital tools in place 
that allow index fund providers to cast, manage, and execute ballots via a 
digital platform, and these tools could permit index fund investors to auto-
matically vote shares according to their voting guidelines without the need to 
engage with each individual contest or ballot item.246  For example, ISS offers 
ProxyExchange, a tool which “simplifies the proxy voting process” by allow-
ing clients to “automate [their] routine tasks” and vote according to standard-
ized voting guidelines.247  Similarly, Broadridge offers ProxyEdge, a digital 
proxy management solution that allows its users to have their votes cast ac-
cording to “automated voting rules and integrated vote recommendations.”248  
Tools like these could be applied to the task of voting the index funds’ shares 
according to the preferences set out by individual shareholders themselves 
instead of the preferences determined by index fund teams.  Because this 
substantial infrastructure exists and is already utilized by index fund provid-
ers, the task of incorporating index fund investors’ perspectives would be 
considerably less burdensome than it might initially appear. 
3.  Increased Index Fund Fees 
Third, depending on the characteristics of the approach taken, deference 
to index fund investors might increase the costs associated with index fund 
services.  It may be more burdensome and therefore more costly to ascertain 
investors’ actual preferences and then implement those preferences, requiring 
additional employees or additional support from outside firms such as proxy 
advisors. 
                                                          
 245.  See Fisch, supra note 149, at 39. 
 246.  Id. at 22–23. 
 247.  Proxy Exchange, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, https://www.issgovern-
ance.com/solutions/proxy-voting-services/proxy-exchange/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 248.  BROADRIDGE, PROXYEDGE (2018), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-
proxyedge-complete-proxy-management-from-voting-through-reporting.pdf. 
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However, given the existing infrastructure at index funds that permits 
funds to vote their proxies according to predetermined guidelines, these cost 
increases are unlikely to be especially significant at a per-investor level.249  
There may be some minimal costs associated with modifying these existing 
tools to support increased investor involvement, and there would be costs 
involved in developing the survey and conducting the survey.  Considering 
the existing infrastructure and the enormous scale of index fund providers, it 
seems likely that any incremental cost increases would be relatively mod-
est.250 
4.  Potential Legal Impediments 
An additional concern centers on whether there are any legal impedi-
ments to seeking index fund investors’ input on proxy voting and other re-
lated matters.  First, there are the potentially burdensome requirements for 
proxy solicitations to consider.  For example, under section 14(a) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC requires that all proxy solicitations 
must be duly filed unless an applicable exception exists.251  Likewise, proxy 
statements frequently trigger the obligation to furnish shareholders with a 
proxy statement.252  Proxy solicitations are defined as “[t]he furnishing of a 
form of proxy or other communication to security holders under circum-
stances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or 
revocation of a proxy.”253  Unlike in the context of retail investors,254 an at-
tempt by index fund providers to learn more about the interests and voting 
priorities of their clients very likely would not constitute a proxy solicitation.  
This is because the index fund itself is the beneficial owner of all shares con-
trolled by that index fund and therefore retains the right and obligation to 
                                                          
 249.  See Fisch, supra note 149, at 39 (noting that “institutional investors have access to a variety 
of services that simplify the mechanics of proxy voting, including: (1) a centralized Internet plat-
form on which they can access information relating to voting matters for their entire portfolio; (2) 
the ability to cast votes through this platform; and (3) the ability to designate voting policies or 
preferences, rather than casting votes on an individual, firm-by-firm basis”). 
 250.  Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I, supra note 26, at 10 (noting that index 
funds benefit from economies of scale when implementing investment stewardship); see Fisch, su-
pra note 149, at 53 (“[S]ome institutional investors, such as Blackrock and Vanguard, devote sub-
stantial resources to voting research.”). 
 251.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (2019) (providing that “Sections 240.14a–3 to 240.14a–15, except 
as specified, apply to every solicitation of a proxy with respect to securities registered pursuant to 
section 12 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78l), whether or not trading in such securities has been suspended”). 
 252.  See id. § 240.14a-3 (outlining information that must be furnished to shareholders). 
 253.  Id. § 240.14a-1. 
 254.  See Fisch, supra note 149, at 40. 
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vote shares.255  The board of an index fund generally delegates voting author-
ity to an investment advisor, and the board and these investment advisers 
have a fiduciary duty “to vote proxies of portfolio securities in the best inter-
est of fund shareholders,” in this case, the index fund investors.256  Because 
of the way that this relationship is structured, seeking input of individual in-
dex fund investors about voting priorities and interests would be a way for 
index fund providers to better fulfill their fiduciary duties to index fund in-
vestors and not a proxy solicitation.  This means that the burdensome require-
ments accompanying proxy solicitations would not apply to this context, 
making it considerably easier in this respect to involve index fund investors 
in the decision-making process as compared to retail investors.257 
An additional potential legal hurdle is Rule 14(a)-4(d).  This rule re-
stricts the time in which a proxy can confer voting authority, prohibiting con-
ference of authority “with respect to more than one meeting” or for “any an-
nual meeting other than the next annual meeting.”258  Again, these time 
limitations do not apply in the index fund context due to the structure of mu-
tual funds and the fact that the mutual fund itself retains the right to vote the 
funds’ proxies. 
Still, these provisions likely reflect a more general concern by regulators 
that allowing investors to preemptively express preferences on how they 
would like to vote would encourage uninformed, generic voting.259  Despite 
these fears, the proposals suggested here would not be a change from the 
status quo in terms of promoting preemptive voting.  Index fund providers 
already cast their votes largely according to generic voting guidelines that are 
formulated without reference to individual contexts and may be shaped in 
advance of proxy solicitations.  Additionally, steps could be taken to mitigate 
concerns about reliance upon generic or pre-formulated voting guidelines, 
including opting to have index fund investors select representation by other 
agents who would have the ability to investigate firm-specific issues more 
thoroughly, permitting index fund investors to update their preferences or 
survey data at any point, requesting surveys be updated once annually, and 
allowing investors to designate authority for index fund managers to override 
                                                          
 255.  Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 (Jan. 31, 2003) (“Because a 
mutual fund is the beneficial owner of its portfolio securities, the fund’s board of directors, acting 
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 256.  Id. 
 257.  Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 182, at 1276 (noting that “participation in a proxy solicita-
tion triggers burdensome federal disclosure obligations”). 
 258.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d)(2)–(3). 
 259.  See Fisch, supra note 149, at 43. 
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preferences recorded in a survey when firm-specific considerations support 
doing so.  In these ways, it is possible that seeking index fund investors’ input 
on voting decisions could be structured in such a way as to involve regular 
input from these investors or to permit some consideration of firm-specific 
issues. 
A third potential legal impediment would be any laws or regulations 
imposing duties on shareholders to cast their votes in an informed manner.  
Once again, such regulations would not apply to index fund investors, since 
they are not shareholders in portfolio companies but rather shareholders of 
the index fund itself.  If anything, action by index fund providers to better 
understand the interests, perspectives, and priorities of their shareholders 
would likely result in more informed voting that enables index fund providers 
to better fulfill their fiduciary duties to vote shares in the best interests of 
index fund investors.260  Moreover, neither state law261 nor federal law pred-
icate voting rights on being duly informed.262  Thus, even if investor involve-
ment in shaping voting decisions would be based upon uninformed thinking, 
there are no clear legal requirements for informed voting and no prohibitions 
on non-voting indirect investors engaging in an informed expression of their 
interests and values. 
5.  A Choice Between Fractured Power and a Unified Voice 
Fifth, deferring to shareholders raises an important question for how 
those votes would be carried out.  To the extent that shareholders express 
different and opposite preferences (whether directly or indirectly), index fund 
fiduciaries would be charged with voting on behalf of conflicting parties.  
These fiduciaries would then need to either vote a proportional number of 
shares in favor of each opposite position or to vote all shares according to the 
most popular position. 
The former (proportional) approach would diminish the power of index 
funds, since their power would be fractured in support of two different and 
opposite ends.  However, to the extent that the concentration of power in the 
hands of index funds is a problem, limiting this power is advantageous.  Ad-
ditionally, dividing votes between priorities would ensure that these votes 
were cast in proportion to a given proposals’ actual support, making it more 
likely that the outcome with the greatest support actually comes to fruition 
once all votes are tabulated.  The proportional approach may also complicate 
engagements, since it would likely be more difficult to exert indirect pressure 
                                                          
 260.  Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management 
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564. 
 261.  See Fisch, supra note 149, at 47. 
 262.  Id. at 49 (“Federal law does not actually require, however, that shareholders be informed.”). 
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towards opposing ends.  Again, this may be a positive consequence, particu-
larly if these engagements give undue influence to index funds or reduce 
transparency and accountability. 
The latter (winner-take-all) approach would maintain index funds’ 
power and maximize their ability to leverage their influence via engage-
ments.  However, it would also mean that index fund agents would be de-
monstrably pursuing ends antithetical to the express interests and wishes of 
many of their principals, an outcome in tension with the principles of agency 
law and fiduciary relationships generally.  Of course, it is extremely likely 
that index funds already utilize their votes in a way that is inconsistent with 
the preferences and interests of some of their clients; these preferences are 
just unknown and therefore much easier to ignore or dismiss.  In this way, 
aligning the voting behaviors with the preferences of even a majority of in-
vestors would be an improvement on the status quo. 
Ultimately, it would be preferable for index funds to wield their votes 
proportionally to the preferences expressed by actual index fund investors to 
the extent possible, as the advantages of maximum faithfulness to the inter-
ests of their investors appear to outweigh the costs in the form of diminished 
influence (which, depending on one’s perspective, may actually be an added 
benefit).  Such an outcome is also more consistent with our notions of share-
holder democracy, which generally feature voting in proportion to share own-
ership.263 
6.  A Question of Method 
Finally, there is the question of which of the above approaches to defer-
ring to index fund investors ought to be the one utilized and who ought to 
decide that matter.  The best way to capture the true interests and values of 
individual investors as they relate to corporate governance would be to take 
a direct approach.  By surveying their investors directly on key corporate 
governance issues, rather than relying on indirect measures such as represen-
tation and inferences based on their general characteristics, index funds can 
best understand and utilize the actual views of their investors.  Such a course 
of action would provide individual investors with the most direct avenue for 
influencing corporate governance as well as the greatest check on index 
funds’ power. 
Alternatively, however, it would be possible to let individual index fund 
investors decide for themselves through the market.  If index fund providers 
were to offer their investors a choice between different forms of involvement 
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(or if different index fund providers varied in the types of involvement they 
offered), investors would be able to select whichever option they preferred, 
whether that be selection of representation, provision of general data to be 
used in guiding decisions, or direct input on key questions in corporate gov-
ernance.  In making their selection, these investors would be able to balance 
the degree of control offered against the costs in the form of increased fees, 
to the extent that there are any.  In this way, it may not be necessary or even 
desirable to select a single option; if the index fund industry pursues multiple 
ways for individual investors to interact with index fund agents and their in-
vestment stewardship teams, this will provide maximum choice for investors 
and allow investors to select the option that best fits their needs. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The proposals set forth in this Article start from the basic premise that 
shareholder democracy should be democratic—that is, it should be controlled 
by the individual human investors who make up its constituents.  As it cur-
rently stands, the shareholder franchise does not extend to individual human 
investors if they invested indirectly through certain intermediaries, including 
index funds.  When index fund investing was relatively rare, the fact that 
these individuals did not retain voting power was essentially irrelevant, since 
their degree of influence was so small that it was unlikely to impact voting 
outcomes.  Now that index fund providers have the power to shape the be-
haviors of nearly all publicly traded companies in the United States, however, 
the contrast between notions of a true democracy and the status quo where a 
handful of index fund agents wield virtually all of index funds’ power is ex-
ceedingly stark. 
This Article seeks to promote a version of index fund voting that better 
approximates a true democracy by involving individual human investors in 
the voting process.  It argues that such a course of action would ensure that 
corporate decisionmaking was better aligned with individual human inves-
tors’ interests and values.  Further, the proposed changes would also mitigate 
several problems with index funds’ increasing dominance by decreasing con-
centration of power, increasing the heterogeneity in voting by index fund 
providers, improving incentives for good stewardship, reuniting ownership 
with ownership, reducing agency costs, and ensuring that index funds are not 
passive in their approach to corporate governance.  Moreover, the proposals 
herein accomplish the same goals as other competing proposals while avoid-
ing their potentially drastic consequences, such as destroying the fundamen-
tal business model of index funds via heavy-handed antitrust solutions or to-
tally disenfranchising the holders of what will soon be the majority of all 
equity assets. 
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These proposals also serve as an important step to transcend rational 
apathy for individual investors.  Individual investors have long been unin-
volved in corporate decisionmaking because of their relatively small stake in 
a given company and the large and burdensome task of engaging with indi-
vidual ballot items at individual portfolio companies.  By greatly simplifying 
and concentrating these tasks, this proposal utilizes the existing infrastructure 
at index fund providers to transform individual investors’ rational apathy into 
rational involvement.  Given the current state of such infrastructure and other 
digital technology, there is no reason that institutional investors should be 
able to rely upon services and tools that allow them to aggregate and auto-
mate voting decisions while individual investors themselves are deprived of 
such tools.  Such changes would add much-needed legitimacy to the share-
holder franchise, the foundation of all other corporate governance, and they 
would provide a voice to the actual human investors for whom the whole 
system is supposed to be working. 
